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Will Trump really deport students for antisemitism?

Students who 'sympathise' with Hamas may have their visas revoked. Credit: Getty

Students who 'sympathise' with Hamas may have their visas revoked. Credit: Getty

January 31 2025 - 1:00pm

In the flurry of executive orders issued by Donald Trump in the first few days of his second presidential term, one in particular stands out. Just recently, the President signed an order instructing various law enforcement agencies to urgently investigate antisemitism on US university campuses, and propose recommendations for how to solve this putative crisis. With customary bluster, Trump is promising very harsh punishments for the people in his sights: those who “sympathize” with Hamas will supposedly soon have their student visas revoked and face deportation from the United States.

In some ways, this represents a chilling step toward abrogating the rights of free speech — which in America are not just protected by law, but are also a part of the culture and self-identity of the nation. It used to be that Americans would lambast “nanny state Europe” for caring more about feelings than rights and trying to micromanage speech rules rather than err on the side of freedom. But those days are now mostly gone. As the political situation has worsened, as more and more Americans have lost faith in the political system, and as polarization has become more pronounced, the country’s political class has clearly retreated from its earlier, optimistic view of the power of free speech.

Trump’s executive order is more reflective of a broader attitude than a practical plan. For one thing, the very serious waves of student protests during 2024 over Israel’s war in Gaza were hardly driven by foreign nationals — the overwhelming majority of “problem students” are those who have American citizenship and who thus cannot be deported in the first place. The idea that people would pay very large sums of money to travel to America specifically in order to protest is not particularly realistic.

What’s more, the question of how to practically implement Trump’s desires here ought to prompt a great deal of head-scratching. If “Hamas sympathizers” are meant to be deported, how exactly is that “sympathy” meant to be detected? Is partaking in a political protest itself sufficient proof, or will the state perhaps hire other students to serve as informants and spies, writing reports on things said in dormitory hallways and over the internet? If it’s the former, one wonders whether conduct that is completely legal for Americans to partake in can actually serve as grounds for deportation without facing serious legal challenges.

In the end, though, the question of foreigners spreading “radicalism” is very much a red herring. America’s radicalism today is home-grown, and though both Democrats and Republicans have become increasingly eager to try and ban their way to political peace and quiet, it seems unlikely that either side will ever manage to succeed. In 2020, then-President Joe Biden signed similar measures hunting for “radicals” and “extremists” within the US Army and National Guard: the end result was a self-defeating, onerous bureaucratic witch hunt that pretty much everyone now regrets.

Americans are ultimately contentious, outspoken people who react badly to attempts at speech control — anyone who doubts that only has to look at Donald Trump himself.


Malcom Kyeyune is a freelance writer living in Uppsala, Sweden

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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