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Why is Zack Polanski so obsessed with imperial guilt?

Zack Polanski speaks to William Dalrymple. Credit: Bold Politics

Zack Polanski speaks to William Dalrymple. Credit: Bold Politics

30 June 2026 - 1:00pm

Nothing can more rapidly diminish my respect for a person than their utterance of the phrase “I didn’t learn about this at school.” It’s a confession of unattractive qualities — incuriosity, a bovine passivity, and often a patchy, selective memory. It implies that schools ought to have a monopoly on learning, and that being spoon-fed by a teacher is a good substitute for picking up a book.

Nor can these memories of what one didn’t learn at school always be relied upon. We were all schoolchildren once, and we know that we didn’t always pay full attention. When people complain that they didn’t learn about a subject at school, it’s always worth testing their facility with trigonometry or titration.

Neither William Dalrymple nor Zack Polanski, apparently, learned about the British Empire when they were at school. On Polanski’s podcast, Bold Politics, they agreed that this was a moral disaster. The British Empire is the “elephant in the room”, the cause of so many of the world’s current ills: everything would be better if only the country’s imperial past were taught in schools.

The problem is that the British Empire is taught in schools. It has been on the national curriculum for history for as long as such a thing has existed. As former education secretary Michael Gove pointed out with a hint of glee, both Polanski and Dalrymple were privately educated, and in private schools the writ of the national curriculum does not run.

In Dalrymple’s case, one gets the sense that he won’t be satisfied until all school history lessons are about the British Empire. He has a monocausal view of the world: the Empire explains everything. The reason for “moral confusion” on the Israel-Palestine conflict, he suggests to Polanski — by which he seems to mean that not everybody in Britain is as fervently pro-Palestine as he is — is a lack of teaching on the subject in schools. His argument for the centrality of the British Empire to the ongoing war is shabby, emphasising Britain’s training of what became the IDF, for example, without ever mentioning the country’s extensive military support for Jordan during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.

Both Dalrymple and Polanski stand to benefit from the “I didn’t learn about the British Empire at school” myth. Dalrymple gets to market his books and podcasts as granting access to “secret knowledge” — what could be more enticing than that? Meanwhile, it flatters Polanski’s ego by making him seem like he is taking on a conservative establishment. When he says he wants empire to be at the heart of the curriculum, he obviously does not have in mind drilling schoolchildren with the names of battles and colonial administrators. What he and Dalrymple want instead is a national exercise in self-flagellation.

In that vein, what should we cut from the curriculum to make more room for classes in imperial guilt? Those who insist on making their favourite subjects mandatory often forget that schools and history teachers are already pressed for time. Polanski and Dalrymple guffaw a few times about the six wives of Henry VIII, their go-to example of school history frivolity. When I learned about the six wives of Henry VIII, there was, amidst the frivolity, a serious point to it all. Henry VIII’s chaotic love life, we learned, played a part in England’s break from Rome. That is rather an important moment in our island story. Perhaps it is even as important as our Empire.


Samuel Rubinstein is a writer and historian.
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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

1 July 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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