On Tuesday, Donald Trump announced that the United States would impose a new 50% tariff on all copper imports. “Today we’re doing copper,” he declared, suggesting that the measures would extend to other commodities. And, naturally, this decision is about much more than just copper.

Copper is the lifeblood of modern infrastructure, from the electrical grid to advanced military hardware, but the AI revolution has created another major consumption category which is poised to grow over the coming decades. These are data centers, which use approximately 27 tonnes of copper per MW of power capacity, reflecting the commodity’s critical role in power distribution, cooling systems, and data transmission.

America imports about half its copper, while only having three domestic copper smelters. This is in stark contrast to China, which is home to 10 of the world’s 20 largest smelters by capacity. Beijing controls over 50% of global smelting capacity; in an era where supply chains can easily be weaponized, the notion that America could be held hostage by a single foreign producer creates justifiable unease in Washington.

The US copper industry has been in steady decline for several decades, with smelting and refining capacities now a shadow of what they used to be. The Trump administration’s argument is straightforward: tariffs will incentivize investment, create jobs in mining communities, and reverse the hollowing-out of America’s industrial base.

However, building new capacity can take decades and domestic manufacturers are left to pay record-high prices before completion, while overseas competitors enjoy the benefits of China’s oversupply. It is also true, though, that Beijing’s dominance in copper processing is not an accident. Rather, it is the result of deliberate policy, state subsidies, and a willingness to play the long game. And so Trump’s tariffs are as much about countering China’s market manipulation as they are about supporting miners in states like Arizona.

Creating bottlenecks, especially in commodity processing, has been an integral part of Beijing’s geopolitical strategy. The country has relentlessly pursued this strategy for decades, and now Trump is now trying to upend it in a single presidential term. China processes approximately 85% of the world’s rare earths, and controls about 70% of global rare-earth mining. It is also the leading processor of graphite, lithium, cobalt, and magnet rare earths. For example, it produces 99% of battery-grade graphite and more than 60% of lithium chemicals globally.

These copper tariffs should be viewed as an attempt to regain American economic sovereignty, and to reshape critical supply chains in order to exclude China as much as possible. The policy could succeed in jumpstarting domestic investment and reducing strategic vulnerabilities, but it is unlikely to have such an effect before the 2026 midterm elections or the 2028 presidential campaign. So there is still the chance it could backfire economically and politically, saddling American industry with higher costs — and the Trump administration with fewer friends.

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Ralph Schoellhammer is assistant professor of International Relations at Webster University, Vienna.

Raphfel

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