The draft framework plan for Ukraine is at times vague and strangely worded. But it is still the best basis for a lasting peace that Ukraine, Russia and Europe are ever likely — realistically speaking — to get. All the governments involved have, understandably, so far responded cautiously to the plan, and some tough negotiations lie ahead. Nevertheless, it would be a historic tragedy if these end in failure and the war continued.

Since much of the Western media has — absurdly — described this as a “capitulation” to Russia’s “maximalist demands”, it is necessary to point out the ways in which this plan also represents Russian concessions. These are evident in comparison to Putin’s aims when he launched the invasion, but also relative to the Russian demands set out in June 2024, which still officially represent Russia’s position.

Crucially, the plan secures Russia’s formal recognition of Ukraine’s right to join the European Union, the key issue behind the Maidan revolt of 2013-14. If Ukraine and the EU can make this a reality, it would anchor Ukraine in the West far more firmly than Nato membership alone could.

In addition, while Russia had previously demanded that Russian be established as an official second national language in Ukraine, the current plan takes a more limited approach. It stipulates that Ukraine will adopt EU standards on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities, and that both countries will agree to abolish discriminatory measures while guaranteeing the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and educational institutions.

This is a very significant concession because my Russian sources told me only last month that, given the EU’s total failure to protect Russian minority rights in the Baltic States, no EU guarantees could be taken seriously.

In the plan, Russia also abandons its previous demand that Ukraine cede the entirety of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces and receives only de facto recognition of its control over Crimea and the Donbas. Instead of the immediate suspension of sanctions, Russia receives only the vague promise that “Sanction relief will be discussed and agreed upon in phases and on a case-by-case basis.”

The provision for an amnesty for both sides has been portrayed as a concession to Russia in order to get cases against Russian leaders at the International Criminal Court dropped. However, the Wall Street Journal reports that: “A senior U.S. official said that Ukraine significantly changed one of the 28 points in the version that appeared online. In an apparent move to expose alleged corruption, the draft had called for an audit of all international aid Ukraine had received. The language was changed to say all parties will receive “full amnesty for their actions during the war”.

The Ukrainian standing armed forces are to be limited to 600,000 men, but far from being a real concession this looks like a device to save Putin’s face. Ukraine cannot possibly sustain a peacetime standing army of 600,000 men. In any future war, it would call up reserves. Moreover, in the Istanbul talks of March 2022 Ukraine was proposing a limit of 250,000 men.

On the Ukrainian side, the biggest and most difficult concession by far is agreeing to withdraw from the approximately 14% of the Donbas region that Ukraine still holds. Ukrainians have described this to me as completely impossible and said that it would risk a mutiny against it in the army.

This proposal is, however, softened by the criterion that while the area would come under Russian administrative control, it would be demilitarized and supervised by neutral peacekeepers. And above all, the Ukrainian military must ask whether it is destined to lose this territory if the war drags on, and whether it is truly worth risking US support and tens of thousands of lives in a futile attempt to hold it.

Other alleged “concessions” by Ukraine and Europe are not real concessions at all. It has long been obvious that the promise of Nato membership for Ukraine is empty, since all Nato governments have made clear that they will never go to war to defend Ukraine. Similarly, the bar on Nato troops — and hence a European “reassurance force” — in Ukraine is meaningless, because most European states have refused to take part in such a force. British officials, the chief advocates of the project, have even admitted that no British ground troops would be sent and that the whole idea depended on a US “backstop”, which Trump will not provide.

Most importantly, if Russia and Ukraine agree to this memorandum, it would bring an immediate ceasefire. Violence would end, refugees could return, and rebuilding could begin. The plan foresees a cooperative economic and security relationship between the US and Russia and halts further Nato expansion. This is the best deal both parties can hope for, and walking away now would risk throwing all of it away.

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Anatol Lieven is a former war correspondent and Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft in Washington DC.

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