After several days of hype, US President Donald Trump and Nato Secretary-General Mark Rutte met in the Oval Office today to announce their new plan for getting military aid to Ukraine: European countries will purchase US weapons that they would then send on to Kyiv. Though the press conference itself was light on details, Rutte described the deal as “really big” and evidence that “Europeans [are] stepping up.”

The new tranche of military aid to Ukraine is a big deal, but not for the reasons Rutte and Trump suggested. Militarily, the new initiative is more show than substance. The amount of aid that arrives in the near-term will be limited, with much of the new equipment taking months or even years to arrive. Politically, however, Trump’s decision to support additional aid packages for Ukraine — even with European money — is consequential. Not only does it deepen his commitment to a war he wanted to end, but it makes the conflict “his war,” raising the stakes and making it harder for him to walk away without political fallout.

Despite the fanfare and optimism in Kyiv, the new plan to aid Ukraine with European weapons purchases won’t change the military balance on the battlefield in the near or longer term. Under the arrangement, Europe will likely exploit three mechanisms to send military assistance to Ukraine, but all three face significant constraints that will reduce any practical benefit to Ukraine’s war effort.

First, Europe can send Ukraine arms directly from their own stockpiles and then buy US weapons to backfill what they provide. They have been doing this since the beginning of the war, and at this point, what they can part with is limited in quantity and scope. Second, Europe can pay the US for weapons Washington takes out of its reserves, and Washington can use that money to refill its arsenals. It is likely that some of the new aid will make its way to Kyiv through this pathway, but quantities will again be small.

American stockpiles are already significantly depleted, raising concerns about Washington’s ability to meet global commitments. Both Trump and Rutte emphasized that American readiness would be safeguarded — a signal that any further drawdowns from US reserves are likely to be limited. Meanwhile, Europe can supply Ukraine with newly-produced weapons. While these are not constrained by existing inventories, they face production delays and may not arrive for months or even years.

The bottom line is that the new aid promised to Ukraine today will amount to much less than advertised, especially for frontline soldiers. Moreover, much of the announced aid is defensive in nature, including additional Patriot systems and interceptor missiles. More Patriots will certainly help protect Ukrainian cities, but they will do little to enable Ukraine’s army to strengthen its position against Russia’s summer offensive.

Now that Trump has endorsed continued military assistance, including possible further withdrawals from US stocks, it will be much harder for him to cut ties with Ukraine without political consequence. Despite efforts to insist that this is “Biden’s war”, Trump could face repercussions from a Ukrainian collapse, for example, and could find himself forced to keep authorizing new aid to prevent such an outcome.

Continuing to funnel military equipment to Ukraine, no matter who pays for it, is also not a political win for Trump because it goes against his campaign promise to keep the country out of long military entanglements and underscores his failure to end this war on his self-imposed timeline.

For Europe, the new Ukraine aid deal is a major win and what Brussels has been hoping for all along. The United States is now tied more firmly to Kyiv, and it will be much harder for Trump to abandon Ukraine (or Europe) in the future. For Trump, however, the deal is a big loss that will limit his political flexibility in far-reaching ways — with Ukraine, with Europe, and especially with his own domestic base.

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Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities.

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