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Trump is overlooking rural America’s homicide problem

Police attend the scene of a shooting in Dadeville, Alabama (population: 3,000). Credit: Getty

Police attend the scene of a shooting in Dadeville, Alabama (population: 3,000). Credit: Getty

2 September 2025 - 4:30pm

Donald Trump knows that tackling blue-city crime is political gold, despite the setback of today’s ruling on the deployment of troops in Los Angeles earlier this summer. But the President’s own FBI reports that violent crime in rural, small-town red America rivals that of any large US city, as highlighted by a new Axios analysis.

National Guard deployments garner headlines. But in sleepy Greenville, Mississippi, (population: 26,411), residents have lived under a summer-long 9 pm to 6 am curfew. A spate of crime caused the lockdown in a town where the homicide rate is nearly four times the national average. Greenville is no outlier. This reality runs counter to public opinion, according to which 81% believe crime is only a “major problem” in big cities. This is the political calculus behind Trump’s threat to send more troops to blue states. He wants voters to associate Republicans with small-town order and Democrats with big-city crime. Yet the rural South and West are also plagued by murder and mayhem.

In 2025, eight of the 12 states with the highest murder rates were once part of the Confederacy. Historians posit that “racism” and “honour culture” account for this. Others claim limp institutions, schools, employers, and law enforcement are the root cause. But this is a chicken-and-egg argument. Institutions do not stand outside society, and society is deeply influenced by institutions. So, what are the factors that cause crime and violence to spike?

When a 2020 study identified the most dangerous “cities” in America, three of the top four were little more than small towns. Anniston in Alabama, Bessemer in Alabama, and McKeesport in Pennsylvania average 21,000 residents. But they all have a history of a once robust iron and steel industry. Deindustrialisation and job loss caused social dislocation, poverty, and eventually spiralling crime beyond urban America. A 2024 Brookings Report demonstrates that even short-term declines in jobs and schooling caused the jump in crime during and after the pandemic.

When institutions are weak and jobs sparse, crime tends to rise. Western states with high rates of crime and violence, such as New Mexico and Alaska, share with the South poverty and failing institutions. Poverty and jobs are sticky issues with no easy, quick fixes, but government is hardly powerless in restoring public order. In Greenville, the curfew has spawned a 79% fall in violent crime. Murders are down 90%, while aggravated assaults have dropped by 76%. In the nation’s capital, carjackings have fallen by 87%, and all crime has dropped by 15%. However, these emergency measures are not long-term solutions.

Trump knows the politics of crime. Really, deploying the National Guard is a feint to goad Democrats into defending an unpopular status quo. Sending in external troops is not a long-term solution. After all, what is deployed must, eventually, be undeployed. But Democrats have options. A generation ago, they built institutions which helped solve a generation-long crime wave. Among the many provisions of the Democrat’s 1994 “Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act” was federal funding of 100,000 police officers. Dispersed throughout the nation and under local control, these officers helped engineer a profound transformation in public safety.

From 1973-91, violent crime, rape, and aggravated assaults spiralled by 83%, 73%, and 118%, respectively. But during the Nineties, American homicide rates fell by 43%. Crimes against property crashed by 34%, and violent crime by a third. In New York City, murders fell by 75% over the course of the decade. Bill Clinton’s surge of police was scarcely the sole cause, but his crime bill nevertheless represented an America in which political leadership identified a problem and offered grown-up remedies. Justice, as the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr once counselled, only offers “proximate solutions to insoluble problems”.

Trump is right to argue that the federal government has a responsibility for public safety. But this should apply to blue cities and red states alike.


Jeff Bloodworth is a writer and professor of American political history at Gannon University

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

1 July 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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