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The media sheds a tear for exiting federal workers

Get back to work. Credit: Getty

Get back to work. Credit: Getty

29 January 2025 - 6:30pm

Late last week, Politico published an insidery DC horror story about the “dark mood” at federal agencies as government bureaucrats fretted about the ramifications of President Donald Trump returning to the White House. These government functionaries fear that Trump is “coming for their jobs” with new executive orders aimed at paring back the horribly overgrown federal bureaucracy. “I am terrified,” complained one staffer.

It’s a bit odd for a collection of employees just offered generous eight-month buyout plans by the President if they’d no longer like to continue in their jobs. Maybe if the threat of firing really is so “terrifying,” such an offer would be a lifeline. That the bitter rumblings have continued since says a lot about the actual interests of these employees.

And the coverage of them over the last few weeks says a great deal about the legacy media that so much reporting has been devoted to the plight of these poor bureaucrats. For example, the New York Times reported last weekend that “a Federal Trade Commission employee was so anxious that he told family members not to talk about politics on unencrypted lines.” Meanwhile, Reuters noted that federal and even public sector workers were “stunned” and afraid. Similar themes were also picked up in the Washington Post, CNN and Politico (again).

Lost in this narrative is why these positions have become expendable. Trump ran on a commitment to shrink the federal bureaucracy, which clearly chimed with the American public. Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) is premised on this very idea: the size of government has grown too large and unwieldy, and so must be reined in.

But because these workers hail from a similar social milieu as journalists, their job losses have received outsized attention. Other industries have not been so lucky. Take the example of coalminers and other workers tied to the extractive energy industry that has powered America for hundreds of years. Back in 2019, former president Joe Biden told them to “learn to code”. The media lapped it up, primarily because the miners were seen as enemies of the green agenda. Take this 2021 piece, from the New York Times, titled “The Achilles’ Heel of Biden’s Climate Plan? Coal Miners.” The sub-headline is even richer: “Unions representing other workers affected by climate legislation have struck deals, but opposition from coal miners has persisted, complicating the path to enactment.”

For simply fighting back against their jobs being eliminated, these coalminers weren’t real flesh-and-blood humans, but instead complications to a political agenda. This view was confirmed by a piece from CNN around the same time, which asserted that the end of the coal industry was the only way for “humanity […] to save itself”. And any complaining about this was simply, as a Politico piece claimed, a problem of “mindset”. If these miners can’t learn new skills and adapt, well, the future will simply leave them behind — they should’ve pursued more valuable skills, we’re told.

That even after the 2024 election, the corporate press still sees America as divided between the ennobled Left and the deplorable Right makes one other important point clear: it hasn’t learned anything since Trump’s first term. Journalists still see themselves as crusaders interested only in telling the stories of beleaguered liberals. It’s not journalism, rightly understood, just narrative-creation — and one prone to all of the mistakes made by the press last time around.

The media should simply apply the same cold logic it applied to coalminers to the bureaucrats. Political reality has passed them by. Industries evolve, jobs change. The federal bureaucracy is no exception to this. Maybe, then, they should learn to code.


Drew Holden is the managing editor at American Compass and Commonplace. He is also the author of the Holden Court newsletter on Substack. 


China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

1 July 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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