X Close

Shigeru Ishiba’s exit is a sign of deeper Japanese malaise

Ishiba is Japan's twelfth PM this century. Credit: Getty

Ishiba is Japan’s twelfth PM this century. Credit: Getty

7 September 2025 - 12:30pm

Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has resigned. The 68-year-old veteran of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who became party leader on his fifth attempt, served less than a year in the top post. Speaking at a press conference on Sunday evening (Japan time), Ishiba cited the ongoing US tariff negotiations, which he described as entering a “critical phase”, as a key factor in his decision. He added that now was the right moment to “make way for the next generation.”

In reality, the tariff talks were likely just an excuse. Ishiba had long been in a painfully weak position, surviving only because there was no credible alternative. After his party lost its majority in the Lower House elections last October — a gamble he had rushed into — and then again in the Upper House elections in July, his grip on power became untenable. Losing one election might be chalked up to misfortune, but losing two made it impossible for him to remain in office for much longer.

The election defeats were indelible stains. It was hard to see how Ishiba could have presented himself as the man to rebuild his party. He had no support within the party, which is a crucial element of Japanese politics, with its factions, king-makers and “shadow shoguns”. Still, the Japanese PM remained defiant, even vowing as recently as last week that he would stay on and oversee an economic stimulus package.

In the end, however, it became clear that he was isolated. Party bigwigs finally got through to him, and he has bowed — quite literally, as is customary in Japan — to the inevitable.

What does this say about Japan? If you thought European politics was messy, things are no better here. The country remains trapped under the seemingly perpetual, if increasingly brittle, rule of the LDP — a party that is little more than an uneasy coalition of factions, marked by infighting, shadowy manoeuvrings, and occasional corruption.

Alternatives do exist, but they are either hardly distinguishable from the LDP in policy or too new and untested to be credible. The rise of Sanseito — the Japanese equivalent of hardline, Reform-style immigration parties, dubbed “far-right” by some — has both alarmed and energised observers. Yet the party remains small and unproven, looking more like a flashy tech start-up than a serious contender for government.

It also highlights how weak and ineffectual Japanese prime ministers can be: Ishiba is the twelfth to hold the office this century. It was not that he was especially unpopular. His approval rating had been rising in recent weeks. He is widely regarded as intelligent and serious, with an independent streak — he once did the unthinkable and resigned from the LDP on principle. He handled the tariff negotiations with President Trump about as well as could be expected, avoiding a rupture with the US despite evident frustration. He is moderate and reasonable and has largely steered clear of personal scandal, which in Japan feels like a real achievement. Yet in the end, none of that counted.

As for what happens next, the LDP will have to elect a new leader. This means that there will be internal leadership vote to nominate Ishiba’s successor, which will be held in the coming weeks. But a new prime minister will need parliamentary approval, meaning that other parties will have a say in the matter. No standout figure has emerged, and some of the names being floated, such as Agriculture Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, son of former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi, or the Margaret Thatcher–inspired Sanae Takaichi, would be highly controversial. Koizumi is widely seen as a charismatic but lightweight figure, while Takaichi is regarded as an extremist due to her reputation as a hardline conservative.

The sad truth is that today’s resignation underscores how tackling Japan’s enormous structural problems — including an ageing society, a catastrophically low birth rate, a stagnant economy, and growing vulnerability in an increasingly hostile region — may be beyond the capacity of any single politician, at least within the current political structures. Until the system itself changes, Japan is likely to be condemned to weak leaders and stalled progress.


Philip Patrick is a lecturer at a Tokyo university and a freelance journalist.
@Pbp19Philip

China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

1 July 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

miquelvilam