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Russia and China are creating a new axis of energy

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping meet in Beijing earlier this week. Credit: Getty

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping meet in Beijing earlier this week. Credit: Getty

4 September 2025 - 7:30pm

Tuesday’s news that Moscow and Beijing have agreed to build a major new pipeline to pump natural gas from Russia’s Arctic to China was light on detail, but the direction of travel is clear. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the world has shifted to a two-tier energy market where countries willing to buy Russian energy in defiance of Western sanctions benefit from sizeable discounts to global price benchmarks. The Power of Siberia 2 deal demonstrates how this two-tier market is set to remain in place for the long haul, conferring significant economic advantages on buyers of Russian oil and gas, in what might be termed a new “axis of energy”.

The POS2 proposal is hardly new. The project to build the 3,000 km pipeline capable of pumping 50 billion cubic meters each year — roughly the capacity of Europe’s defunct Nord Stream 2 pipeline — has long been stalled as Moscow and Beijing have bickered over financing and contract prices. Many of these details have still to be settled. But it appears the logjam has now been broken. According to Alexei Miller, CEO of Russia’s state energy giant Gazprom, the two countries signed “a legally binding memorandum” to build POS2 during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to China this week.

Putin no doubt wanted to mark his trip with a high-profile announcement. But it is likely the breakthrough was attributable to an agreement in principle on the price of the gas to be pumped. According to Miller, this will be cheaper than the price of Russian gas sold to Europe, a discount he attributed to the higher cost of pumping gas to China. But this is disingenuous. In a seller’s market, higher transport costs would mean higher prices. However, Russian energy is a buyer’s market, in which countries prepared to defy Western sanctions against the Kremlin can command highly favourable terms.

Both the seller and the two big buyers — China and India — were assembled in Tianjin this week for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s summit. While the meeting produced little of substance that was new aside from the POS2 announcement, the rhetoric was all about a new international order to challenge the established system headed by the United States.

The clearest manifestation of this new order can be found in energy markets. Last Thursday, China took delivery of its first cargo of liquefied natural gas shipped from Russia’s new Arctic LNG 2 terminal, despite an array of US and EU sanctions on the project.

Meanwhile, India has also been parading its rejection of US sanctions, after Washington’s secondary tariffs went into effect last week as a punishment for New Delhi’s continued purchases of Russian crude oil. Although these latest measures push the US tariff rate on most Indian goods to 50%, Indian ministers remain defiant, arguing that the country’s purchases of Russian oil are entirely legal and insisting New Delhi will not bow to pressure from the White House.

In recent months, India has imported between 1.5 million and 1.6 million barrels per day of Russian crude oil, second only to China, which buys around 2.2 million barrels a day. The perverse effect of Western sanctions is that India’s imports of Russian oil are now likely to increase. The immediate reason is that EU sanctions against the Russian-owned Nayara Energy mean that regular vessels carrying crude from Middle Eastern producers have stopped delivering cargoes to the company’s Gujarat oil refinery — India’s second largest. As a result, Nayara is likely to make up the shortfall of some 100,000 barrels a day by buying more oil from Russia.

It remains to be seen what damage US secondary tariffs will inflict on India’s economy over the longer run, and whether Indian ministers will waver. But it is likely that Russia’s oil producers will attempt to stiffen their resolve by offering bigger discounts than the modest $3-4 per barrel which India-based buyers receive today. Given that the new $46.70 per barrel EU price cap on Russian oil shipments which came into effect on Wednesday is 32% below the current market price for Brent of $68.90 per barrel, Russian sellers have considerable scope to offer discounts to buyers who are prepared to take delivery of shadow fleet cargoes while still earning a handsome premium over the EU price cap.

With little sign of a ceasefire in Ukraine any time soon, there is every reason to believe that the dynamics on display over the last week — with China and India making a political point of defying Western pressure and continuing to buy cheap Russian energy — will strengthen in the long term.

Over time, this means that the Chinese and Indian economies will benefit at the margin relative to the West from cheaper energy prices. This will only reinforce the trend of recent years in which energy-intensive industries such as petrochemicals have shifted away from Western economies including Germany, where they used to benefit from cheap Russian gas, and towards Asian economies such as China, where in future they will benefit from even cheaper Russian gas. The world has a new axis of energy, and it does not revolve around Western economies.

This is an edited version of an article which originally appeared on Gavekal.


Tom Holland is deputy global research director at Gavekal.


China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

1 July 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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