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Labour’s winter fuel U-turn is government by PR stunt

Rachel Reeves has used much of her political capital on relatively minor policies. Credit: Getty

Rachel Reeves has used much of her political capital on relatively minor policies. Credit: Getty

11 June 2025 - 7:00am

Journalists and biographers alike are captivated by great figures — politicians who seem preternaturally gifted at what they do. But for most of us, it’s enough to focus on getting the basics right. One of the basic rules in politics, as in life, is Don’t do stupid things. When the Labour Party said last year that it would means-test winter fuel payments for pensioners, it did a very stupid thing.

The amount of money that restricting the payments to all but the least well-off pensioners saved was tiny in the grander scheme of things: £1.4 billion in 2024-25, and £1.5 billion in 2025-26. But means-testing the payment was hugely unpopular, and divided Labour internally. It was a direct contributor to the polling slide that the party has seen since it was elected almost a year ago. This week, Rachel Reeves decided to mostly reverse it.

Pensioners on an income of £35,000 or less a year, which includes almost all pensioners in the UK, will now be eligible. Now the Government says that the scheme will save £450 million a year. This is an amount of money so small that one wonders what the point was of bothering to keep any means-testing on the scheme in the first place. The U-turn also came at the last minute, so the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) hasn’t certified that yet either.

It would not be surprising if Reeves faces further battles over relatively trivial savings that have caused internal strife and political ill will. One of the most egregious is the two-child benefits cap, where families do not receive additional child benefit for more than their first two offspring. Scrapping this would cost £3.3 billion, according to estimates from the Institute for Fiscal Studies last year. Again, this isn’t much when considered as part of the £1.2 trillion the Government spends per year. But keeping the cap in place, which affects 38% of children in the bottom fifth of the UK’s income distribution, is unpopular amongst a number of Labour MPs.

Fearing that voters think of Labour as the party of big government spending, Reeves seems almost determined to choose the most politically difficult cuts there are. She is trying to show that she is committed to fiscal strictures, no matter the cost.

But this is just governing by a series of PR exercises — ones which are costly in terms of political capital. Most voters will care less about how you look when you run the country than what you actually do with the responsibility. Passing a bunch of measures, in some cases intentionally, which upset your party’s MPs limits your room for manoeuvre later on.

In practical terms, that also means that Labour has less of a chance of addressing the UK’s biggest issue: a lack of growth. A government’s fiscal balance has both a numerator (how much debt you have) and a denominator (the GDP). The UK’s problem since the global financial crisis has been the denominator, which has not grown much at all over the period. It has also compromised successive prime ministers, since real wage stagnation tends to be bad for popularity.

Addressing that requires a series of reforms which would upset a lot of MPs, many of whom already have to deal with anger from their constituents about everything else. A case in point is planning reform. Simplifying the UK’s sclerotic planning system is one of the most impactful things this government could do, but it will provoke a backlash within the parliamentary party. The Guardian reported last week that ministers are already contemplating amendments to try and appease backbench MPs who are unhappy with the reform’s impact on environmental rules. Delivering growth means using political capital on these difficult but effective things, not focusing on performative stunts like scrapping winter fuel payments.

This is an edited version of an article originally published in the Eurointelligence newsletter


Jack Smith is an analyst at Eurointelligence. He focuses on energy policy, security and defence, EU politics, and the domestic politics of Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands.


China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

1 July 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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