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King of Spain’s flood visit shows the power of monarchy

Futile gestures go further than we think. Credit: Getty

Futile gestures go further than we think. Credit: Getty

4 November 2024 - 4:00pm

It was, in the fullest sense of the word, a medieval scene. Devastating floods had just killed hundreds of people in Spain. Assailed by an angry mob of survivors throwing mud at the visiting dignitaries, Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez had fled the scene with his personal guard after being hit with a shovel.

Meanwhile, the King brushes away the protective umbrella brandied by a lackey, bends down — a ridiculously feudal touch, made necessary by the fact that he is almost a foot taller than everyone around him — to tell his entourage to back off, and plunges himself into a hostile crowd to hear their anger and comfort their sorrow. Later, the Prime Minister’s office would complain that the King should never have gone in the first place, much less drag his chief minister along.

That this tableau, which would have been intelligible to generations of our forebears, should have taken place in 2024 is entirely irrational. Spain is a constitutional democracy, in which King Felipe has no more power to direct the government’s rescue and recovery efforts than he has to govern by fiat and raise ship money. The Spanish monarchy has come under real criticism of late: back in June, 30,000 republicans marched in Madrid calling for its abolition. What’s more, Valencia, the former capital of the defeated republican government, is more hostile towards it than most of the country.

Perhaps there was also an element of public relations management from the Spanish royal household, which published a compilation of clips of the King speaking to and, in one instance, hugging two crying women, without accompanying commentary, as if it said everything that needed to be said. The complaints about royal security’s interference in rescue work was not mentioned.

But the instinct it revealed, though irrational in an age of constitutional government, is a deep-seated one. The instinct to run toward the personification of the state, to bitterly complain about the misdeeds of those who wield the actual power, has never vanished. In an age in which the actual mechanics of governance are as opaque as they have ever been, it tends to reassert itself in moments of crises.

Walter Bagehot, the vulgariser of the British constitution, saw it coming more than a century ago when he wrote that “[t]he best reason why Monarchy is a strong government is that it is an intelligible government.” Parliaments and party politics are “difficult to know and easy to mistake”; but when it comes to the basic principles of monarchy, “anybody can make them out, and no one can ever forget them.”

Bagehot was no defender of a politically powerful monarchy: he thought having a queen meant that those who were elected to govern could get on with it without public drama, a hope since dashed by the rise of quasi-presidential politicians whose private lives provide as much newspaper fodder as the doings of royals.

Yet the instinct to run to the dignified part of the constitution when the efficient part has failed persists. King Charles’s recent visit to Southport after the three murders there, where he was publicly cheered for no very apparent reason except that he was taking an interest in the lives of commoners, is but another example.

And whenever he or the late Queen Elizabeth have gone to places such as Canada and New Zealand, local indigenous leaders invariably ask to meet and to present their demands when it would be far more useful to lobby their MPs. The urge to complain to royals is so powerful in these countries that they have come to encompass governors-general, who are even more politically irrelevant than the monarchs they represent locally.

Indeed, the right to petition the king for redress — once considered so important the English Bill of Rights declared it illegal to make it a crime — still exists and is regularly exercised by desperate complainants, never mind that the invariable response is for such petitions to be referred to whichever department is concerned with it and to reply by way of a pro forma letter.

But petitions — which by law require no postage — keep coming in, even though almost the only official document acknowledging the existence of the right is a policy document of His Majesty’s Prison Service (only British prisoners have the constitutional right to petition the King, though foreign prisoners can do so as a matter of grace).

We sophisticates may well laugh at these futile gestures. We know that it is better to lobby our representatives, to write to newspapers, to post on social media than to waste the time of some royal correspondence officer. We may like to think of ourselves as rational, enlightened creatures, but there is an element of the pre-modern in all of us, which displays its full force when catastrophe hits.


Yuan Yi Zhu is an academic and writer.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

1 July 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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