The Israeli Air Force is feeling emboldened. After its success in Iran, its F-16s are now focused on Syria where, on Wednesday, live broadcasts captured them bombing military headquarters in Damascus, close to the presidential palace.

These strikes are the biggest escalation in Israel’s attacks on Syria since Ahmed al-Sharaa’s regime took control last December. They followed three days of clashes between Druze militias and Bedouin forces loyal to the Islamist government in the Druze-majority region of Suwayda, south of Damascus, during which Israel intervened on the side of the Druze. A brief ceasefire, enforced by government troops sent into Suwayda, swiftly collapsed, bringing Druze militias into direct conflict with government forces.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has justified the strikes in Suwayda and now Damascus as part of an effort to protect the besieged Druze minority in Syria. Around 150,000 Druze live in Israel, many of whom serve in the IDF, and they are fiercely loyal to the state. There is credible evidence that the community is under threat in post-Assad Syria, although this is likely to be less a result of government policy than a lack of control by al-Sharaa’s interim ministry over the country’s sectarian hostilities.

While Israel may feel that it owes the Druze protection, there is no doubt that these strikes are also a calculated power projection strategy. After the fall of Assad, Netanyahu made his distrust of the new regime clear by immediately striking hundreds of military targets, and occupying the buffer zone established between the two countries in the 1974 disengagement agreement. More recently, he has brazenly demanded the full demilitarization of southern Syria, thus preventing the fledgling state from establishing full control over its own territory. Establishing a miniature Israeli protectorate in Suwayda would create a buffer between the Israeli border and government-controlled forces in Damascus.

The question remains, however, as to why Israel would work so hard to antagonize an otherwise natural ally. Mutual loathing of a regional aggressor — in this case Iran — has generally been enough to bring nations together, if only in a marriage of convenience. After Assad fell, there were initially well-founded worries about the anti-Israel posture of hardened Islamist elements in the new government. But since then, Syria has not attacked Israel or even retaliated against its repeated strikes. Al-Sharaa has indicated he would not allow Syria to be a base for attacks on Israel. Meanwhile, his interim government has busied itself intercepting Hezbollah-bound weapons shipments, and dismantling Iranian-linked rocket launchpads. From an Israeli perspective, what’s not to like?

To some extent, Israel’s escalating aggression against its new neighbor illustrates the country’s current reliance on force as the primary means of securing its goals. The signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 demonstrated to Israel the power of diplomacy in guaranteeing its security. However, the 7 October attacks and the subsequent wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran — not to mention the Rightward shift of Israeli politics — seem to have moved the strategic calculus back to asserting the primacy of brute force as the most reliable guarantor.

Nations guided by such attitudes are liable to eventually overreach. Israel’s success has historically been in its ability to speak softly and carry a big stick — using force when necessary, and diplomacy where possible. Unprovoked aggression against Syria will alienate both its new rulers and the other Sunni Arab states, which are keen to bring Syria into their orbit, and have condemned Israel’s attacks. Donald Trump has indicated that he is keen to nudge both Syria and Saudi Arabia into joining the Abraham Accords. Squandering this opportunity would be a colossal act of self-harm.

For the last two years, Israel has devastated its enemies by deploying awesome military and intelligence capabilities against them. But an overreliance on force, an appetite for adventurism, and a presumption of indefinite military dominance would be a strategic error. Israel has seen off most of its enemies for now. But it still has enough of them without having to make new ones.