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Houthi strikes are dividing the MAGA Right

Restrainers are worried about entanglement in the Middle East. Credit: Getty

Restrainers are worried about entanglement in the Middle East. Credit: Getty

March 18 2025 - 4:45pm

The new US strikes against the Houthis in Yemen have revealed some tensions on the Right. Many hawks have applauded these strikes against the militants who have been disrupting global trade since late 2023 by firing on ships in the Red Sea. Others are more skeptical.

American Conservative editor Curt Mills, one of the more prominent “restrainers”, asked in a viral post on X: “What exactly is the US national interest in striking Yemen? Not seeing anything related to America here.” Meanwhile, iconoclastic Kentucky Congressman Thomas Massie appeared to blame the strikes on the insatiable appetite of the “Military Industrial Complex”. Ann Coulter echoed these complaints by doubting the necessity of military action.

Among Republicans, this controversy taps into a broader debate between proponents of a Jacksonian rebalancing and supporters of a more comprehensive geopolitical restraint. While distrustful of idealistic “regime-change” endeavors, Jacksonians champion the targeted exertion of American power abroad to protect US prestige and national interests. Restrainers, on the other hand, are far more skeptical about the efficacy and sustainability of many forms of power-projection abroad.

The divide between these two factions can be seen in the military budget. Many Jacksonians have pushed for increased defense spending, but restrainers have suggested that even the Pentagon’s expense sheets should be trimmed. A populist hawk, Arkansas senator Tom Cotton has long pushed for boosting the defense budget, claiming that Joe Biden underinvested in the defense infrastructure. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Adviser Mike Waltz have long been advocates of an assertive defense position abroad. Even though he calls himself a “hawk”, the populist impresario Steve Bannon has floated cutting the defense budget as part of a bigger project of restraining government spending. Many restrainers see Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard as an important ally in the administration.

Unsurprisingly, these two groups see Trump’s strikes against the Houthis in diametrically opposed ways. Restrainers fear that these attacks could further risk conflict with Iran, one of the key backers of the Houthis. But Jacksonians instead see these strikes as valuable in part because they put pressure on the Iranian regime.

Yet one of Trump’s key traits — and, arguably, strengths — is that he is a man of no ideology or school. Rather than running foreign policy through the calculus of some ideology, he governs through a fusion of amour propre and an assessment of interest. From that perspective, the case for the Houthi strikes seems fairly straightforward. Pounding the Houthis seems a return to the “don’t poke the eagle, and let’s make a deal” approach to policymaking from his first term. In some respects, bombing the Houthis has echoes of Trump’s targeting of Qasem Soleimani in 2020. While the president has usually been averse to long-term “nation building” enterprises, he has long been willing to use American firepower to take out key adversaries, whether Soleimani, Isis or Houthi militants.

There’s a reason why US policymakers have for centuries prioritized free movement across the oceans; insecure access to commerce abroad threatens both US businesses and consumers. It’s clear that the Houthi attacks on container ships have helped drive up prices for global shipping, even for routes that do not traverse the Red Sea. Under Trump, the United States has tried to strengthen alliances with Saudi Arabia and Israel, both of which have tangled with the Houthis. Meanwhile, Trump has also begun a campaign of “maximum pressure” against Iran to try to get that country to sit down and make a deal on its nuclear program. Raining fire on the Houthis is likely part of that effort.

Hitting the Houthis may also be a way of putting pressure on China. As Lloyd’s List Intelligence reported late last year, Chinese ships seem to be mostly exempted from Houthi attacks. It is obviously a strategic advantage for the United States for its allies to be blocked in the Red Sea while Beijing gets a free pass, so knocking back Houthi militants at once checks Beijing and reasserts American geopolitical standing.

The spiraling chaos in the Middle East became a whirlpool that sucked in the Biden presidency, and the new administration seems to be trying to avoid the fate of its predecessor. Trump’s team may hope that more targeted strikes could help keep American rivals and competitors off balance, which could give more space for the forging of regional settlements that would preserve key US interests while also sharing the load with American allies or at least security partners.

While they may disagree on many issues, both Jacksonians and restrainers think that the US needs to reassess its strategy in a time of new geopolitical limits. Trump’s structural realpolitik may give something to both sides. This is the finest policy tightrope. America does have long-term and long-standing interests in being able to project power abroad, which incentivizes alliances as well as access to global commerce. At the same time, fiscal and geopolitical pressures offer new constraints; it’s not 1989 anymore. A successful rebalancing needs to take into account the reality of those constraints as well as imperatives of national greatness.


Fred Bauer is a writer from New England.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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