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Hasan Piker will never be the Democrats’ Joe Rogan

A Leftist masculine ideal? Credit: Getty

A Leftist masculine ideal? Credit: Getty

28 April 2025 - 1:10pm

The New York Times ran a fawning profile of Hasan Piker yesterday, portraying the millionaire Left-wing Twitch streamer as a sort of muscular antidote to the crisis of masculinity which helped propel Donald Trump back to the White House. With his impressive physique, casual approach to gender expression, and seemingly effortless ability to discuss everything from video games to socialism, Piker appears custom-engineered to draw young men back to progressive politics. The NYT piece describes him as the “Joe Rogan of the Left” — a label which speaks volumes about the party’s desperation to recapture the flagging interest of male voters.

This characterisation raises an obvious question: if the Democrats have their own progressive version of Rogan waiting in the wings, then why did they bomb so badly with men in the 2024 election, in which Trump drew 55% of male votes?

The Democrats’ attempt to elevate Piker is doomed precisely because they’re thinking about this all wrong. Rogan isn’t powerful because he’s a conservative media personality — in fact, he’s anything but. In 2022, he pushed back against claims that he was a Republican, describing himself as a “bleeding-heart liberal” on issues including same-sex marriage. What makes Rogan notable is that he didn’t set out to be a political figure at all: he just followed his genuine interests in martial arts, comedy, and psychedelics, bringing along an audience that trusted him precisely because he wasn’t trying to convert them to anything.

Piker, for all his charm, is too explicitly partisan and ideological to fill a heterodox role like Rogan’s. Having gained prominence on The Young Turks, a progressive YouTube show founded by his uncle Cenk Uygur, Piker delivers Generation-Z-inflected democratic socialist perspectives during his daily eight-hour streams. There’s nothing wrong with that, but it’s qualitatively different from Rogan’s approach of exploring disparate ideas through lengthy, free-ranging conversations with guests from across the political spectrum.

When Trump appeared on Rogan’s podcast shortly before November’s election, it represented the culmination of a deliberate Republican strategy. This was, according to CBS, about the “hypermasculine tone that has defined much of his 2024 White House bid”, targeting podcasts followed by young male voters. The Harris campaign, meanwhile, never managed to secure a Rogan interview despite rumours of negotiations, a missed opportunity symbolic of a broader failure to connect with the podcaster’s audience.

This trend can be better understood by going back nearly a decade, to the excitement which swirled in the wake of Bernie Sanders’s failed but highly significant 2016 run for the Democratic nomination. At that point, the “dirtbag Leftist” podcast collective Chapo Trap House seemed poised to become a progressive counterweight to figures like Rogan, with a more decidedly male appeal than other anti-conservative media.

Yet Chapo, despite its popularity and influence, never transcended its niche audience the way Rogan did — it was a political show from the outset and the hosts, who were at a minimum ambivalent toward the Democratic mainstream and now appear to be openly hostile, were doing more than just noticing things and asking questions, as Rogan does. They became a fixture of the subscription-funded firmament, pulling in significant sums that Piker would later eclipse, but mainstream recognition proved more elusive.

The NYT profile of Piker unwittingly doubled down on this misunderstanding in the same way that profiles of Chapo did, portraying him as a secret weapon for the Left — a gym-bro socialist conversant with young Millennial and Gen Z audiences. But this approach reduces masculinity to aesthetic signifiers rather than acknowledging the deeper currents of male bonding, risk-taking, and physical challenge that figures like Rogan — a longtime practitioner of martial arts — embody naturally.

After Trump’s victory, Piker himself acknowledged the Left’s permanent Rogan problem, remarking: “You can’t podcast your way out of this problem.” He criticised Democrats for failing to address economic anxieties, arguing that most Americans “just want to stop the hurt”. This goes some way in identifying the problem: rather than sourcing an ersatz Rogan, Democrats should recognise that the gender gap in voting patterns reflects deeper social shifts.

Bernie Sanders’s two primary runs drew millions of disaffected young voters into the party. Perhaps, therefore, its best hope for future success lies in leaning into a younger, female version of him — New York congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who has distanced herself from both gender ideology and the Democratic Socialists of America. For the party of American women, she may be a safer bet than an inorganic masculine role model.


Oliver Bateman is a historian and journalist based in Pittsburgh. He blogs, vlogs, and podcasts at his Substack, Oliver Bateman Does the Work

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

1 July 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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