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Has Rachel Reeves triggered a gilt yield panic?

Can Rachel Reeves convince the bond markets? Credit: Getty

Can Rachel Reeves convince the bond markets? Credit: Getty

31 October 2024 - 6:30pm

When Rachel Reeves rose to address the House of Commons on Wednesday, yields on the 10-year gilt stood at 4.25%. By Thursday afternoon, some 24 hours later, they were up to 4.5%, while the pound fell.

Obvious parallels to the catastrophic Liz Truss-Kwasi Kwarteng mini-Budget of two years ago immediately came to mind. For the moment, though, it seems unlikely we’ll experience a full-on market crash of the sort that happened then. For one thing, reforms to the pension system which followed that event should staunch the kind of panic-selling which broke out during the Truss premiership.

For another, unlike the 2022 mini-Budget, this Budget doesn’t raise debt on the spurious grounds that tax cuts will supercharge growth — a belief which required a faith in Truss’s genius that investors didn’t share. Reeves has altered the fiscal rules, but has done so in such a way that she will only borrow against assets, ensuring that the extra debt is accounted for in new wealth. Critically, she didn’t sideline the Office of Budget Responsibility, which was called in to mark her maths and show how the figures added up.

In fact, the initial reaction in markets was quite positive. During the course of Reeves’s speech, bond yields actually fell as investors concluded her Budget, while painful in its increased tax burden, was at least sensible and plausible.

Her problems began after she sat back down and the OBR released its assessment. The critical point seemed to come in its conclusion that while her Budget would provide a short-term boost to the economy, its long-term growth impact would be negligible. More bad news came the next day when the respected Institute for Fiscal Studies produced its own assessment of the Budget, and expressed doubts it would work. In particular, the IFS worries that the Chancellor’s maths may not add up after all, and that Reeves will be forced to return to Parliament with more tax rises in the future. The Resolution Foundation joined the pile-on when it issued its own forecast that household incomes would barely budge over the life of this parliament.

As justifiable as tax rises to rebuild public services might be, Reeves appears not to have convinced everyone she has a strategy to relaunch economic growth. She claims that her investments, including in a restored National Health Service, will themselves raise productivity and crowd in private investment. In this, the Chancellor is backed by some economists and the International Monetary Fund. But investors seem unpersuaded, and are thus demanding more generous terms if they are to continue lending to the Government.

Even if a full-on panic is averted, the rise in interest rates, should it continue, will further complicate the Government’s budgeting, and potentially crimp the recovery in the economy as well. There are more measures Reeves can take to support growth which don’t involve spending money, such as tax and planning reforms. However, the most important thing any British government could do is improve upon the trade deal negotiated with Europe after Brexit, whose only remaining defenders today seem to be those who negotiated it.

Yet so far, both Reeves and Prime Minister Keir Starmer have resisted reopening that file, for fear of antagonising Labour’s Brexit supporters. However, if she fails to convince bond markets that she has a plan which will succeed in re-energising the British economy, she may be forced in due course to abandon this timidity. Otherwise, her party may suffer the consequences at the next election.


John Rapley is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West (with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a Religion (Simon & Schuster, 2017).

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

1 July 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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