US Ambassador to Nato Matthew Whitaker dropped quite the bombshell at the Berlin security conference earlier this week. He said it was America’s “aspirational goal” that Germany take over command of Nato, given the country’s recent increased defense spending and Washington’s increasing isolationism. This is highly unusual, since the role of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has always been held by a US four-star general. In theory, Germany has upped its game, but in practice, it’s still a long way from being ready to assume this mantle.

Sitting beside Whitaker on the panel was Lieutenant-General Wolfgang Wien, Germany’s representative to the alliance, who was unable to keep the shock from his face. Wien said that he was “a little bit astonished” since he considered the SACEUR post to be an American one. His discomfort suggested that the leap Whitaker sketched out is vastly larger than it appears on paper.

In principle, Germany has the raw power to lead on European security: it’s the third-largest economy in the world, and is massively increasing its defense spending. But as Defense Minister Boris Pistorius admitted on Wednesday his country will not hit the 3.5% target by 2029. Instead, he expects to reach 3.05%, which is still more than twice what Germany spent before the war in Ukraine.

There are also signs of a shift in mindset. Berlin has just reintroduced a form of national service, requiring 18-year-olds to engage with the military system in a way unseen since conscription was suspended over a decade ago. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Berlin has shed much of its post–Cold War hesitancy. It now sees itself as a pillar of Europe’s defense rather than a reluctant participant.

In theory, Germany’s new posture makes leadership plausible. In practice, Berlin is far from ready. Despite increased budgets, the Bundeswehr still faces severe readiness issues. Equipment shortages, understaffed units, slow procurement cycles and capability gaps persist, especially in logistics, air defense, and heavy armor.

Even if the technical hurdles could be overcome, the symbolic and political ones remain enormous. Commanding Nato’s European forces is not simply about moving troops on a map. It is a historic transfer of strategic authority, one that would demand nuclear-level coordination from a country that does not possess nuclear weapons. It also requires direct ties to the US president, which is another reason why no European nation has held that portfolio in Nato’s 75-year history.

Whitaker himself acknowledged the scale of this shift. “We’re a long way away from that,” he admitted. But the United States is increasingly serious about Europe stepping into a leadership role commensurate with its economic power. And among European states, Germany is the obvious candidate.

It’s not a bad idea. A German-led Nato command could strengthen Europe’s defense autonomy, rebalance transatlantic responsibilities, and signal that the continent is no longer content to rely primarily on Washington’s protection. But there are also risks: domestic political tension, a changing transatlantic relationship and the wariness of European neighbors who may look askance at a more assertive Germany.

Whitaker’s remarks should not be dismissed as an offhand provocation from an angry “America First” White House. They force Germany, Europe, and Nato to confront a fundamental question: is Europe prepared for a future in which strategic leadership is shared more equally — or even led — by Europeans themselves? For now, the honest answer is no. But the fact that this conversation is happening at all reveals that, in the near future, the answer must be yes.

---

Katja Hoyer is a German-British historian and writer. She is the author, most recently, of Beyond the Wall: East Germany, 1949-1990.

hoyer_kat

---