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Euthanasia of child in Netherlands is a warning for UK

The first child under 12 has been euthanised in the Netherlands according to the nation's health ministry. Credit: Getty

The first child under 12 has been euthanised in the Netherlands according to the nation's health ministry. Credit: Getty

June 24 2026 - 3:35pm

When it first came into force on 1 April 2002, the Netherlands’ euthanasia law permitted physicians to end a patient’s life without criminal liability. This would be provided that the patient was either a newborn baby or over 12 years old, and was deemed to be unbearably suffering with no prospect of improvement.

Just 23 short years later, the first child under the age of 12 has been euthanized in the Netherlands, according to revelations from the nation’s Health Minister, Sophie Hermans this week. The law was changed to allow for this two years ago, following suit from its neighbor, Belgium, which became the first country to provide euthanasia for children of any age.

Everywhere that euthanasia or assisted suicide has been made legal, attempts to expand the eligibility of the law have rapidly been made. Many of them have been successful.

In Canada, euthanasia and assisted suicide were made legal in 2016 for people whose death was deemed to be reasonably foreseeable. Just 10 years and 100,000 deaths later, the law is nothing like what it originally was. In 2021, only five years after the law came into force, the requirement that an individual’s death was to be “reasonably foreseeable” was repealed. Less than a year from now, in March 2027, it could become legal for people to end their lives solely for reasons regarding their mental health.

Now, there are discussions in Canada for the law to be expanded to allow for the euthanasia of newborn babies. The Quebec College of Physicians claim that the euthanasia of newborns with “deformations” or “medical syndromes” may constitute an “appropriate treatment”. The expansion of such laws is the logical endpoint of legislation that uses arbitrary eligibility criteria and malleable terminology to decide who qualifies to end their lives.

It is precisely this vague terminology that so many people who are concerned about the assisted suicide bill in England and Wales take issue with. The bill, which was brought back to parliament in May after being previously not making it past the Lords, restricts eligibility to adults who are deemed to be terminally ill, with a prognosis of six months or less. Already, this law is more lax than those in other nations, as suffering itself is not a prerequisite; the physician’s guess is the key defining criterion.

Speaking during the bill’s Third Reading in the House of Commons, then-sponsor of the bill, Kim Leadbeater, said that under the legislation, “only terminally ill patients who are eligible under the strict criteria and want to access assisted dying can do so”. Even if this were the case — which countless MPs, Peers, and experts elsewhere have explained is not — it would only be so until the inevitable campaign to expand the law occurred.

This is not a hypothetical slippery slope. Assisted suicide lobby group My Death, My Decision plainly states on its website that those in the organization “do not believe that there is a strong moral case to limit this option solely to those with six months left to live”, arguing that “life expectancy in and of itself says nothing” about the extent of an individual’s suffering. Humanists UK, another prominent lobby group, responded to the introduction of Leadbeater’s bill by arguing that an assisted suicide law should also be for “those who are suffering intolerably from incurable conditions which may not be terminal”.

Both critics and supporters of the reincarnated assisted suicide bill are sick to death of it; debate around it dragged on for 18 months before running out of time in the Lords, and it threatens to drag on again, too, with neither side seeming likely to concede any ground. It will have its second reading in the House of Commons, for the second time, on 11 September. MPs and the wider public should be aware that a vote for the bill is inevitably a vote to open the door to the further expansion of the law, as has been the case elsewhere, and as the lobby groups themselves desire. This tragedy in the making must be ended now, before it is too late.


Adam James Pollock is a writer and photographer, and the author of Sustenance.


China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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