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Edmund White was the master chronicler of hidden gay life

A pioneer of literature. Credit: Getty

A pioneer of literature. Credit: Getty

6 June 2025 - 1:20pm

At the end of Evelyn Waugh’s novel of madness and authorship, The Ordeal of Gilbert Pinfold, Gilbert starts to write. “He knew what had to be done […] a hamper to be unpacked of fresh, rich experience — perishable goods.” Novelists dream of fresh, rich experience, and readers, too. Not many novelists have made so much of unexplored lives as Edmund White, who has just died at the age of 85. His frankness and stylistic elegance opened up unexplored territories of human behaviour and social custom.

The centre of White’s appeal was a series of autobiographical novels about growing up gay in postwar America. Beginning with A Boy’s Own Story and continuing with The Beautiful Room Is Empty and the experience of Aids in The Farewell Symphony, they gathered a large readership from the start. His books are what serious American fiction rarely is: totally frank and exceedingly funny. The classical, aesthetic beauty of White’s balanced prose turned lives of evanescence — casual sex, faithless friendships, moments of unforgivable silliness — into something permanent.

It’s what the best novelists have always done: annex areas of human behaviour that have not been thoroughly explored, and make them accessible to a new and wide readership. Anyone who delved back beyond A Boy’s Own Story found an unexpected backlist for a bestseller — two ravishingly baroque books, The Joy of Gay Sex and a brilliantly witty travel book, States of Desire, voyaging through homosexual America. (Instantly a period piece — I read it in the mid-Eighties and was thrilled by its hilarity and rather appalled by the sympathy in its Boston chapter towards politicised paedophiles).

White had a literary perversity that wouldn’t play to expectations. His first book after the immense success of A Boy’s Own Story is the fantastical romance of Caracole. White was the most sociable of men, not just on the piers of Manhattan, but this book seemed calculated to put him outside the pale, containing a fictionalised defamatory account of Susan Sontag’s relationship with her son David. On the other hand, he was the most supportive of literary stars, going on with his gay writers’ group The Violet Quill, always interested in meeting and reading a new author.

I loved him. My acquaintance with him didn’t go as far as calling him Bunny, but I treasure the memory of taking him, a new boyfriend and an English novelist friend into the House of Commons when I was working there in the mid-1990s. When the security staff at the entrance ran an enormous shopping bag of Edmund’s through the X-ray, they had to pull him aside. It had revealed a dagger. It turned out that Edmund had come straight from a highland attire shop — he was rather keen about kilts as bedtime wear for his new boyfriend, and had gone so far as to include a skean dhu. The security staff forgave him. How could you not?

Edmund was a glorious human being, and a wonderful writer. His superb biography of the French novelist Jean Genet shows just how responsible and professional he could be, and to the end, he continued to write magnificent books. I strongly recommend his saucy late novel Jack Holmes and His Friend, an account of a man with (the friend of the titular character) a gigantic penis, liberally shared around. He hardly ever won a major prize or the acclaim of the polite establishment. On the other hand, I dare say that anyone who has read one of his books to the end comes away with one of his sentences burned in their memory. Words unused by others, but unforgettable from his pen.


Philip Hensher is the author of 11 novels and a Professor of Creative Writing at Bath Spa University. His new book, A History of the Novel in Britain, will be published by Pelican in September.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

1 July 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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