These days, it seems like everyone has a proposal for how Ukraine can turn the tables on Russia, regain its lost territory, and win the war. The latest entry comes from none other than retired US four-star general David Petraeus, best known for his leading role in the disastrous campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In an interview with The Telegraph, Petraeus has laid out a three-part plan for Kyiv’s victory. The first two pieces of his programme — economic sanctions and security guarantees for Ukraine — have been dissected ad nauseam. His military recommendations are perhaps more novel: more drones, including long-range systems and robotic submarines. Ultimately, however, Petraeus’s solution to Ukraine’s woes will be no more effective than previous prescriptions, leaving Kyiv in an even worse position than it is now.

Petraeus is correct that drones have played a transformational role in the Russia-Ukraine war. They have supplemented and, in some cases, replaced conventional missiles and supercharged each side’s ability to surveil the other. Up to 80% of casualties in the conflict have come from first-person-view drones, and the use of these cheap systems has made massing ground forces for offensive advances challenging. This has been especially important for Ukraine, which has been able to use drones to prevent surprise attacks and somewhat mitigate its shortage of personnel.

But drones alone will not help Ukraine win the war, even if produced in much larger numbers, with greater firepower and longer range. The primary value of drones on the battlefield thus far has been defensive, not offensive. They can do little, therefore, to help Ukraine regain lost territory. Even if Kyiv’s goal is simply to prevent further Russian gains, drones will provide only marginal benefits until Ukraine finds a way to address manpower and materiel shortages.

In this and other areas, Ukraine does and will continue to lag behind its much larger Russian adversary. Russia has a three-to-one personnel advantage over Ukraine and produces several times as much ammunition per month than all of Nato combined. More recently, Russia has also achieved an advantage in drone production — both in terms of numbers and speed of innovation. More investment in Ukraine’s drone industry may help close the quantity gap, but it will not regain the technological edge that Russia now holds.

Petraeus goes on to recommend that Ukraine focus on two specific types of drones: long-range and underwater. He argues that both can help Ukraine achieve a tactical advantage, yet even this is doubtful. Long-range drones pack less firepower than the longer-range missiles that Ukraine has sought from the United States, but they can be produced more cheaply and in much larger numbers by Kyiv’s own defence industrial base.

Long‑range drones — with ranges exceeding 1,000 km — can strike Russia’s critical infrastructure, disrupt supply lines and threaten key military targets, including the launch platforms used to bombard Ukrainian cities. However, even an intensified long-range strike campaign using drones will provide Ukraine only marginal benefits. Russia’s geographic size means that it will be able to move strategic military assets, logistical nodes, and supply lines out of Ukraine’s reach.

Successful strikes will impose costs on Russia, but these will not be enough to disrupt Moscow’s ability to equip frontline personnel with ammunition, missiles, or other materiel, or change the military balance on the ground. They will also be insufficient to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to make concessions. He has already shown a willingness to incur and endure high costs to achieve his goals in Ukraine.

The strangest piece of Petraeus’s guidance is his assertion that more underwater autonomous capabilities can play a big role in Ukraine’s eventual triumph. Ukraine has had significant success in using surface and underwater drones against Russia’s Black Sea fleet, driving remaining vessels back to Russian coastal ports. This has prevented Moscow from using warships in the Black Sea to strike Ukrainian territory, and has allowed Ukraine to resume its commercial grain trade.

However, gains in the Black Sea matter little when it comes to the war’s outcome. Although losing more ships would be embarrassing to the Kremlin, it would not affect Russia’s ground campaign in any real way. In fact, too much focus on maritime activities would be an unhelpful distraction for Kyiv, which should be concentrating scarce resources where they are most needed, on bolstering air defence and protecting the frontline from catastrophic collapse.

The unfortunate truth is that Ukraine’s battlefield position is becoming increasingly dire. There is no one weapon or suite of weapons that can reverse Ukraine’s position, despite what Petraeus claims. No single weapon can turn the tide. Ukraine’s best hope therefore lies in negotiations.

---

Jennifer Kavanagh is a senior fellow and director of military analysis at Defense Priorities.

jekavanagh

---