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CIA’s China recruitment videos are a gift to Xi Jinping

One of the CIA videos depicts a low-ranking Chinese official dissatisfied with inequality within the CCP. Credit: CIA/X

One of the CIA videos depicts a low-ranking Chinese official dissatisfied with inequality within the CCP. Credit: CIA/X

4 May 2025 - 7:00pm

On Thursday the CIA released two videos designed to recruit members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as informants for US intelligence. Yet the videos are unlikely to appeal to the Chinese public, assuming they gain much traction on the other side of the Great Firewall. Meanwhile, they could further inflame tensions between Washington and Beijing amid a trade war and lack of clarity from a US administration which swings between desires for dealmaking, deterrence, and decoupling from China.

According to CIA Director John Ratcliffe, such videos have proven effective recruitment mechanisms in the past. Better recruitment of Chinese assets is a priority for the CIA; starting in 2010, Beijing effectively dismantled the agency’s presence in China, imprisoning and executing up to 20 sources.

The videos are designed to target two kinds of CCP official. One follows a hypothetical senior cadre as he notes how many of his colleagues have been purged and wonders if he’ll be next, referencing the continuous dismissals and detentions of Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign. The second follows a lower-ranking official desperate to pursue his own dreams but forced to live according to those of his superiors, playing on widespread popular concerns with income inequality and lack of career prospects.

While the videos might garner recruits, this is likely to be at the cost of further damage to Sino-American relations and to the US’s reputation among the Chinese public.

From Beijing’s perspective, the public announcement of the videos can be seen as an open attack by the US government on China’s political system. The CCP leadership has long feared that Washington’s ultimate aim is regime change in China, and these videos will serve as a confirmation of sorts, particularly coming from a US administration with a defence strategy apparently focused almost solely on deterring China.

China has already taken an uncompromising attitude to the trade war, viewing it as part of a broader geopolitical showdown. Having taken steps to prepare for what the second Trump administration could bring, Beijing has intensified its drive for technological self-sufficiency and presented itself as the more reliable partner to the rest of the world. Meanwhile, the trade war has galvanised Chinese public opinion against the US.

In this context, the videos directly feed Beijing’s broader narrative around Washington’s insidiousness and the failures of the US system. The social problems the videos highlight — an unfair economy, lack of prospects, self-interested oligarchical elites — could easily be seen by many in China as direct reflections of the US under Trump.

While the videos show already-disillusioned viewers how to contact the CIA, their own narrative is far from persuasive. The one targeting lower-ranking officials reads as more American than Chinese in sentiment. The aspiring but dissatisfied official seeks his own individualistic dream. But his current situation — with a family and his own home, and in a good Party job which opens rather than closes doors — is one aspired to by millions in China. Why risk all that by contacting the US security services?

As for the video targeting senior cadres, why, if you were worried about being purged, would the logical next step be to massively increase risk to yourself and your family by logging on to the CIA’s website and giving your superiors legitimate grounds for dismissal, imprisonment, or worse?

Ultimately, the videos and their very public announcement feed directly into Beijing’s narrative that US spies are everywhere and seeking to undermine Chinese society at all levels. As geopolitical tensions rise and Trump’s China policy remains dangerously muddled, the US should be wary of encouraging a view in Beijing that the two countries are engaged in an existential struggle.


William Matthews is a researcher specialising in China and the international order. He has a background in anthropology and comparative social science and writes on Substack.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

1 July 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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