Since all three elections are held in the former East Germany, commentators have been quick to suggest that populism may be in the political DNA of those who once lived under socialism. Really, though, what’s happening in the East is happening all over Germany and Europe. Centrists close their eyes to this at their peril.

The biggest concern for Germany’s political establishment is the AfD, which may win all three states with anything between a quarter and a third of the vote. While other issues play a role, immigration is key. Here in Saxony, where the domestic intelligence service classified the local AfD chapter as ‘Right-wing extremist’, the party’s election posters advocate ‘remigration’ and border controls to neighboring EU countries.

While immigration has long been seen as a particular issue in the East, a major survey showed that West Germans have similar concerns — be that regarding the increased costs for the welfare state (an issue to 77% in the West and 82% in the East) or conflicts between immigrants and local communities (a worry to 71% of West Germans and 82% of East Germans).

The AfD also came second in Hesse and third in Bavaria last year — both in the former West. In Bavaria, the Free Voters came second with a Right-wing agenda and the center-right Christian Social Union won. Together they gained over two-thirds of votes for parties that want to reduce immigration.

Look beyond Germany’s borders and the idea that a shift towards the Right requires recent experience of dictatorship looks increasingly absurd. After all, the results of the European elections were widely described as a ‘Right turn’, as parties of the populist Right won in France, Italy and Austria.

The appeal of the Left-wing BSW under its eponymous leader Sahra Wagenknecht is a different matter. While Left-wing populism is also a political force in other countries such as France, Italy, Greece and Spain, the residual demand for a party to the Left of the Social Democrats (SPD) in eastern Germany since reunification in 1990 is a specific phenomenon.

Wagenknecht herself was born in East Germany, where she joined the ruling Socialist Unity Party in the summer of 1989. She has since been a prominent figure in its successor parties until she left to form her own, the BSW, earlier this year. It instantly gained 6.2% of the vote in the European elections but, unlike the AfD, it can’t claim to be a major player in former West Germany.

In the East, however, Wagenknecht’s mix of personal charisma, sympathy for Russia, anti-immigration rhetoric and Left-wing social policies attracts many voters. Her BSW is polling between 15 and 19% in each of the three state elections. This is in part due to Wagenknecht’s critical views on the war in Ukraine which resonate with many easterners, especially as the Berlin government ceases to provide fresh funds for Kyiv. Recent surveys have shown that a slim majority of West Germans think Russia’s aggression in Ukraine should be met with military strength, while only a third of East Germans agreed — a much bigger divergence than on immigration.

Of course, there are historical reasons why East Germans continue to think and vote differently than their West German counterparts on issues such as Ukraine. But their general direction of travel away from the center isn’t unique.

Dissatisfaction with the status quo, particularly on immigration, has driven more and more voters to the political fringes, not just in the East. If centrists want to reclaim the ground they have lost, they should look at eastern Germany as a case study, not an outlier.

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Katja Hoyer is a German-British historian and writer. She is the author, most recently, of Beyond the Wall: East Germany, 1949-1990.

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