October 17, 2024 - 6:30pm

Almost exactly a year after Hamas’s horrific attack on Israel, its leader Yahya Sinwar has been killed. This is not the end of Hamas, but it does offer Israel an opportunity to destabilise and fragment the group, similar to what Israel has done to Hezbollah — to cut the Islamists down to a more manageable size and bring the war to a conclusion on terms reasonably close to victory.

As I wrote in these pages a couple of months ago, it is not quite right to call Sinwar “the mastermind” of the 7 October attacks: he was among the lead architects, but Hamas is the Palestinian department of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Iran was fully aware in advance of the plans for that day. Still, Sinwar has been the identifiable face of the enemy as Israel wages war to recover hundreds of hostages from Hamas and ensure there can be no future attacks of that magnitude on Israeli soil.

It was important for Israel’s security that Sinwar died. Beyond any of the tactical considerations about the conduct of Israel’s war in Gaza, the country needed to send a strategic message to the region that there is no profit in 7 October-type attacks on the Jewish State. On this score, Israel has succeeded. Hamas’s military leaders — Saleh al-Aruri, Marwan Issa, Mohammed Deif — have all been eliminated, and Hamas’s “political” chief Ismail Haniyeh was killed in an audacious MOSSAD operation in Tehran. Now, Sinwar is the latest to go.

His apparent successor, Rawhi Mushtaha, was confirmed dead two weeks ago, which increases the chances that Sinwar’s brother Mohammed will take over. The question is how long he lasts. Israel killed Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah at the end of September, and his relative Hashem Safieddine replaced him, only to (probably) be killed less than a week later.

These killings are not the same. The decapitation of Hezbollah was a targeted operation enabled by Israel’s infiltration of the group, but Sinwar’s downfall came about “by chance”.

There are similarities, however. Like Hezbollah, Hamas has lost most of its leadership cadre. The group will now have to cope with the same disarray in its command structure and loss of some of its “resistance” sheen. Sustained Israeli pressure on Hamas at this point could induce fractures, particularly with the group’s newer recruits and other non-core members, whose post-7 October morale is waning. Hamas might still exist in name, but its capacities could be diminished to a point where the threat it poses makes it strategically and politically possible for Israel to wind down the war.

Whether Israel is able to exploit this opportunity is unclear. It has so far removed the bulk of its troops from Gaza to deal with Hezbollah in the north, which might give Hamas enough breathing space to reconsolidate.

The easiest way for Hamas to save itself has always been to agree to give back the hostages. This would create an international political situation where it would be difficult for Israel to continue the war in the name of destroying the group. But Sinwar repeatedly blocked this course; his possible successors seem to be in the same mould. And no Israeli government, under any prime minister, will agree to end the war while the group still holds nearly 100 Israeli hostages.


Kyle Orton is an independent terrorism analyst. He tweets at @KyleWOrton