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Why isn’t Labour scrapping non-crime hate incidents?

Tread softer, Keir. Credit: Getty

Tread softer, Keir. Credit: Getty

March 1 2025 - 1:00pm

“Until August 1914 a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly notice the existence of the state, beyond the post office and the policeman.” Such was the suggestion of historian A.J.P. Taylor, at the beginning of his English History 1914-45. Whether you find such a vision attractive or not depends on your wider political views. Taylor himself could hardly have intended it as a straightforward hymn of praise to light-touch government, given his lifelong socialist views.

Regardless, that conception of the role of government was dead and buried long ago. It is, though, the vital context for understanding the news that the Labor government is apparently working to ensure that non-crime hate incidents (NCHIs) continue to be recorded, albeit under a different name. NCHIs were strongly criticized by the Court of Appeal in a 2021 ruling as having a potential “chilling effect” on free speech. They have been the target of much criticism and negative campaigning. Getting rid of them entirely would be straightforward, an easy win for Labor, and yet the party refuses to do so, despite the Prime Minister’s promise last year of “a politics that treads a little lighter on all of our lives”.

For Labor, there is no real contradiction here; it would argue that in a highly diverse society, controlling “hate speech” or “misinformation” is part of keeping the peace, and so protects citizens in a more indirect way. This is why many Left-wing people struggle to understand objections to diversity training, or to the VAT raid on private schools: equality is crucial to a healthy society, so any sacrifices are worth it. It explains the seemingly vindictive sentencing of people who made unwise comments on social media during last summer’s riots. The extraordinary recent criticism of Keir Starmer and Kemi Badenoch by the Lady Chief Justice for daring to debate judicial rulings also reflects the modern state’s wariness of robustly expressed opinion.

Of course, the ultimate logic of this way of thinking is endless interference in people’s personal interactions and political opinions, because unjust social relations – or at least what modern progressives regard as unjust social relations — are the near-inevitable outcome of a genuinely free society. Once upon a time, civil liberties campaigners trained their on the state’s restrictions on the individual, which were relatively simple to remove. Now those battles are won, and attention has turned to supposed injustices arising from the attitudes and beliefs of private citizens and private institutions — sexism, homophobia, transphobia, etc. Given their vague and almost infinitely elastic definitions, abolishing these supposed injustices requires the state to tread very heavily indeed on all our lives.

This is the paradox of a permissive and multicultural society: how do you manage the people who don’t want to be permissive and multicultural? How do you restrain the power of the state when your own ideology legitimizes, in principle, almost endless interference in the day-to-day interactions of ordinary people? Non-crime hate incidents are the logical conclusion of this ideology; it continued unchecked under successive Conservative governments, and it’s going nowhere under this one.


Niall Gooch is a public sector worker and occasional writer who lives in Kent.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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