April 13, 2024 - 8:12pm

If the wisest place to hide a leaf is in a forest, the best way to conceal an unsuccessful war is to nestle it within a far wider conflagration. With Benjamin Netanyahu’s war in Gaza sputtering towards a simultaneously bloody and inconclusive end, the isolated Israeli strongman appears to have rolled the dice on expanding the conflict to drag out his political survival for as long as possible.

As Eran Etzion, former deputy head of Israel’s National Security Council, remarked on X this weekend: “The [elimination] of the Iranian general in Damascus was one of two things – either serious strategic negligence that needs to be investigated, or a deliberate effort to bring Iran into the campaign, in complete opposition to the demands of the US and its interests.”

However Netanyahu’s risky gamble works out for Israel, his brinkmanship places both Israel’s American sponsor and Iranian rival in difficult, almost impossible positions. With 57% of Biden voters now believing that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza, the White House’s overriding interest is to conclude, as swiftly as possible, the war that will now define Biden’s legacy.

America’s last intervention on Israel’s behalf, in the Red Sea, has not gone well, exposing the limitations of America’s hard power. On the back foot in Ukraine, and struggling to keep up with China’s military buildup in the Pacific, America simply does not have the resources to get embroiled in yet another debilitating war in the Middle East.

No wonder, then, that while committing America’s arms to Israel’s defence, US officials have repeatedly stressed that they were given no advance warning of the attack, with Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin reportedly dressing down his Israeli counterpart in private, even as Israeli officials urge the US to publicly back them to the hilt in an attempt to dampen Iran’s response.

But for Iran, too, the choice of how or whether to respond is not an easy one. Having publicly committed itself to a firm response, the Iranian leadership must balance the difficult line between restoring deterrence and committing itself to a wider war whose outcome is necessarily uncertain. Aside from the devastating Israeli response that may follow, a major strike could turn American public opinion back in Israel’s favour, eroding Iran’s greatest strategic victory since the war began.

A carefully calibrated response — such as limiting strikes to the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, internationally recognised as Syrian territory — seems to be Tehran’s preferred option, providing Netanyahu with an off-ramp that striking the Israeli heartland would not. There are other combat indicators of a more measured Iranian response in the offing, such as the mobilisation of Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq: indeed, given the peculiarities of American politics, a proxy strike against US facilities in the region may be a safer option for Iran than attacking Israel itself.

While Iranian officials bide for time, viewing Israel and America’s anxiety as they wait for the hammer to fall as a victory in itself, Tehran will soon have to respond, or accept the loss of face — and deterrent power — that comes with turning the other cheek. As Iranian officials reportedly believe: “they are thinking there might be a war in a few weeks if they respond, or there will definitely be a war in a year if they don’t respond.” Even as America and Iran hammer out their modus vivendi, behind the scenes, and through go-betweens, the region edges closer towards the unthinkable.

As Etzion observes: “What happens or does not happen in the Iran-USA-Israel triangle will redefine the ‘borders of the system, and shape the near future to a considerable extent”. The coming hours will determine whether the old rivals Washington and Tehran can, together, avoid the war that neither wants to fight.


Aris Roussinos is an UnHerd columnist and a former war reporter.

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