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Upholding Palestine Action proscription creates a policing nightmare

Yesterday, the Court of Appeal found in the Home Office’s favour on its decision to proscribe Palestine Action as a terrorist group. Credit: Getty

Yesterday, the Court of Appeal found in the Home Office’s favour on its decision to proscribe Palestine Action as a terrorist group. Credit: Getty

June 16 2026 - 7:00am

Palestine Action has had an eventful, if unhappy, few days. At the end of last week, the “Filton Four” were jailed, much to the fury of the online pro-Palestine Left. Then, yesterday, the Court of Appeal found in the Home Office’s favor on its decision to proscribe it as a terrorist group — more than 100 people were later arrested at demonstrations in central London against the decision. Much to the online Left’s chagrin, there’s some consolation for activists. First of all, the appeal route isn’t exhausted — the group’s co-founder, Huda Ammori, has pledged to take the case further. Secondly, some have suggested the Filton activists were given relatively generous sentences. Although it’s doubtful that Palestine Action will be looking on the bright side, they should take comfort in knowing who the real losers are. As usual, it’s the police.

During anti-proscription protests last year, the police were confronted by hundreds of demonstrators committing de facto terrorist offenses by supporting a proscribed organization. “Street bail” was issued by officers unable to process the volume of offenders, many of whom were pensioners. The optics, even for those broadly supportive of Palestine Action’s proscription, were awful. Should the group continue down this route, using mass law-breaking as a form of protest, it will undoubtedly put more pressure on beleaguered police forces. After the Belfast riots, this is the last thing chief constables need.

Then there’s an even thornier issue: what of the hardcore Palestine Action activists prepared to take part in direct political action and violence? Counterterrorism officers will be considering whether the group will use even more cellular tactics, with a hardcore group going underground to escape detection. Such techniques might resemble the Animal Liberation Front of the Eighties and Nineties. Then, activists from the group attempted to stay off the law enforcement radar. Support groups and spokespeople were used to convey messages via “intermediaries”.

The group were, for nearly 20 years, remarkably successful. Never proscribed as a terrorist organization, the Animal Liberation Front nonetheless enjoyed a vein of popular support for animal welfare. Palestine Action, now, has similar traction among the mainstream Left. Another, perhaps more troubling, comparison might be the Baader-Meinhof group and the Red Army Faction. Ostensibly, there are similarities: both Palestine Action and the RAF featured educated, middle-class, Left-wing radicals. Like Palestine Action, the Red Army Faction was initially motivated by overseas wars. Radicalized by Vietnam, Baader-Meinhof terrorists soon pivoted to Palestine and anti-capitalism, echoing the modern Left’s “Omnicause”. Surprisingly, given their propensity for kidnapping, murder and bombing, a section of the German public was sympathetic to their cause.

These similarities won’t be lost on the police and security services. More worryingly, the authorities have no authority to speak directly to the concerns of Palestine Action either: that lies within the gift of the American and Israeli governments. Given the proscription, will the situation escalate?

At the moment, it’s not clear. A cellular Palestine Action, like the Animal Liberation Front before it, would have no “army council” to arbitrate strategy. Which, in a digital age of encrypted communications, means the security services might be forced back into the “old ways” of human intelligence and techniques such as embedding operatives within the group. Such work is risky and resource-intensive. And, for British police forces, it might well distract them from the legal burden of processing thousands of pensioners and students for holding up signs proclaiming their support for Palestine Action. After all, when everyone’s a “terrorist”, where do investigators begin to look?


Dominic Adler is a writer and former detective in the Metropolitan Police. He worked in counterterrorism, anticorruption and criminal intelligence, and now discusses policing on his Substack.

China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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