July 23, 2024 - 3:30pm

Germany’s leadership is panicking. Not because of the potential collapse of the front line in Ukraine, nor because of the looming deindustrialisation of the German economy. No, the country’s leaders are panicking because of the potential election of Donald Trump as US president this November. Yet while initial fears of a Trump presidency were overblown, the German elite may be reading a second term for the GOP candidate correctly.

Trump has made no secret that he hopes to end the Ukraine war, and even possibly pull American military support from Europe. He hinted at this before during his first run for president. But in 2016 this was not a widely-held position in Washington and, most importantly, no major war has been lost in Europe. Today, Ukraine’s military is seriously struggling and Kyiv is even putting out peace-feelers, while a large element of the DC bureaucracy is becoming aware that the United States is overstretched.

The problem for Germany is that, under the leadership of Olaf Scholz, it has invested almost everything in this war. The national economy, which used to be the pride and joy of the German people, is deindustrialising due to the sanctions and counter-sanctions that are a direct consequence of the conflict. A Trump administration is also promising tariffs that could produce a drag effect of anywhere between 0.5% and 1.5% of Germany’s annual GDP growth.

Germany’s economic humiliation over the past two years has been brutal. During the eurozone debt crisis, Germany was able to portray itself as the adult in the room, on hand to help supervise the economic management of supposedly profligate countries such as Italy, Portugal, and Spain. But now these countries are growing much more rapidly than Germany.

Why did Germany stake everything on the war in Ukraine? After all, it was obvious to all but the most stubborn political observers that Ukraine might lose and the mood might change in Washington. The only explanation is that Germany suffers from an acute crisis of leadership in its politics and a major crisis of competence within its state and civil service. The people who portray themselves as the adults in the room are not fit for prime-time.

Before cutting aid to Ukraine last week, Berlin had followed in Washington’s trail, outsourcing its leadership to the United States. Germans observing this trend might have assumed that America was a politically stable country. But with the recent assassination attempt on Trump and the collapse of Joe Biden’s candidacy, Germans are no doubt starting to wonder if they were sold a false bill of goods.

Against a backdrop of record-low approval ratings for the Chancellor and his government, worries are mounting about Ukraine losing the war (or at least a diplomatic resolution emboldening Vladimir Putin), poor economic growth, and a fatal reliance on Russian energy imports. At the same time, its increasingly bellicose stance towards Beijing — also a product of the government outsourcing its decision-making to DC — was on display after a recent Nato forum when the country moved to exclude China from its 5G network. If Trump is elected in November, the one relationship on which Germany bet all its political capital will likely sour.

Germany has been through difficult spells before. In the Twenties, an infamously incompetent post-war political class almost destroyed the country, thereby paving the way for the rise of the National Socialists and the darkest period in the country’s history. A century on, the 2020s are unlikely to be as bad as the Weimar period. But there is little doubt that the current German leadership class will be remembered as the least competent since the Second World War, and will be blamed for the dark days that are still to come.


Philip Pilkington is a macroeconomist and investment professional, and the author of The Reformation in Economics

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