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The Online Safety Act threatens Wikipedia’s future

According to this week's ruling, Technology Secretary Peter Kyle doesn't have a 'green light' to impede Wikipedia's operations. Credit: Getty

According to this week's ruling, Technology Secretary Peter Kyle doesn't have a 'green light' to impede Wikipedia's operations. Credit: Getty

August 14 2025 - 7:00am

Would you trust online information posted by anonymous users? If you’ve ever used the “largest and most-read reference work in history”, the answer is probably yes. Wikipedia is collaboratively edited by users, most of whom are anonymous. But anonymity is under threat from the UK’s Online Safety Act, so the Wikimedia Foundation made a legal bid for judicial review into how its own operations might be affected. On Monday, the organization lost.

Wikipedia risks being designated a Category 1 service. According to Regulation 3 of the OSA, in force since 26 February, Category 1 is for services which provide user-to-user content to a large number of UK viewers. These services are obliged to offer adults the option of verification and allow them to opt out from seeing content produced by non-verified users. If Wikipedia fell into that category, this would put most of its content out of sight. Although, as the judge pointed out this week, that would be up to the reader to decide.

The ruling against the Wikimedia Foundation is essentially a technicality, stemming from the fact that the organization has not yet been placed in Category 1. Though the OSA is already in force, Ofcom is yet to draw up the official register of Category 1 services, which will actually designate the sites required to offer such protections. Until Ofcom releases its list, no site has been definitively required to comply. So the court did add a warning: the rule did not give the Technology Secretary or Ofcom “a green light to implement a regime that would significantly impede Wikipedia’s operations”. Beyond the question of legality, there’s two reasons why the Government should heed this.

First, user anonymity is not always a bad thing. You might reasonably prefer to know who is telling you something, even on a site like Wikipedia. Critics have argued, for example, that Wikipedia’s celebrated neutrality actually slides towards certain political outlooks, and that the internal editing process facilitates groupthink. Nevertheless, much valuable information, reporting and opinion-sharing online would simply be impossible if every user were required to verify their real-world identity before posting.

Journalists are taught to protect sources by guarding their anonymity, even under pressure from authority, for good reason: if potential witnesses can’t trust reporters, they won’t speak up. In the age of “user-generated content”, that professional intermediary is often missing — but sources still need protection. From authoritarian regimes to cancel culture, many people have good reasons to stay anonymous online.

Second, the court case reveals the nebulous nature of the “harms” against which the OSA claims to protect us. Misinformation is a difficult problem to define, let alone legislate against. The desire to control “viral dissemination” in itself betrays the fear of uncontrolled mass communication embedded in the Act. Intervening into such significant websites for this poorly defined reason consequently appears to cover for more authoritarian aims.

Unfortunately, Wikimedia’s case was not based on this serious question. Instead, it simply sought to appear as one of the Good Guys: spreading not misinformation but reliable, neutral, crowd-sourced information. An example of this was the suspension of editing of a webpage about Southport killer Axel Rudakubana, to prevent the posting of speculative or unverified content. But this gets the wrong end of the stick: Wikipedia then applied just the kind of editorial control which OSA wants to itself impose. The problem with the OSA is not that websites can well apply these controls for themselves, but that such controls should not be mandatory in the first place.

The Online Safety Act is already being accused of censorship, as scenes of protests and speeches in Parliament are hidden from users who haven’t proved they are over 18. But, as the Wikipedia case shows, the potential for hiding content from adults goes much further. Making tech companies responsible for preventing the viral dissemination of content that might in some vague way be harmful is a limitless charter for online censorship.


Timandra Harkness presents the BBC Radio 4 series, FutureProofing and How To Disagree. Her book, Technology is Not the Problem, is published by Harper Collins.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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