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The NHS can survive without mass immigration

Are Britain's health and social care services really on the brink of collapse? Credit: Getty

Are Britain's health and social care services really on the brink of collapse? Credit: Getty

March 10 2025 - 5:15pm

One claim frequently made about Britain’s immigration system is that current levels must continue because the NHS, or the care system, would otherwise cease functioning. Last month, John Harris wrote in the Guardian: “Without hundreds of thousands of people who have come to the UK from abroad, the most basic aspects of how we look after old, infirm and ill people would simply collapse.” This argument, however, ignores both current policy and history, and is usually presented without taking into account the record levels of immigration in recent years. As an argument, it is also highly parochial: those who make it never think to compare Britain with our closest neighbors and ask why we are so much more reliant on this form of immigration than they are.

The NHS is indeed highly dependent on immigration. As of September 2024, 36% of its 156,000 hospital doctors and 30% of its 400,000 nurses were non-UK nationals. The UK’s high rate of foreign medical staff is hardly a new trend, but neither is it a constant law of nature divorced from political decisions. The figures from recent years have been unprecedented, with a slower level of change until 2020 before an accelerated rise once the Conservative government introduced the Health and Care visa in August 2020. This is when the “Boriswave” really came into effect.

The change in adult social care is even more marked. The balance between British, EU and non-EU staff had been relatively static until 2022/23, at which point it started to shift strongly towards non-EU workers due to the addition of care workers and home carers to the Health and Care visa in February 2022. Importing foreign healthcare workers is a growing trend globally, but why is Britain so much more extreme than other European countries?

The proportion of adult social care workers with non-EU nationality doubled from 2021/2 to 2023/4
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OECD statistics for 2024 show that Britain, along with Ireland, is a massive outlier in the percentage of foreign-trained doctors and nurses. Norway, Sweden and Switzerland appear to be outliers too, but their situation is not really comparable. In Norway and Sweden, large numbers of foreign-trained medical staff are native students who studied for their medical qualifications abroad before returning home, while in Switzerland nearly all the foreign-trained doctors and nurses come from neighboring countries. Other European countries range from having half the British rate of foreign doctors and nurses (e.g. Germany) or down to a third or less (e.g. France, Italy and Denmark).

What’s behind this disparity? We often hear of the large numbers of British and Irish doctors moving abroad, requiring replacements from other countries, but the numbers are not as great as are often suggested. Britain trains around 9,500 graduate doctors per year, of which in 2022 1,403 left to practice abroad (around 15%), while data from 2012-17 indicates that 43% of those who do work abroad later return, generally within three years. This indicates that less than 10% of British graduate doctors are lost to other countries over the long term.

Doctors leaving for abroad therefore cannot fully explain the high rates of foreign-trained doctors in Britain and Ireland. Given that comparable European countries like France can run a superior health service with far lower rates of foreign workers, the way we do things is evidently not the only choice available. Neither is it the case that Britain gets its healthcare on the cheap by importing lower-paid medical staff. Looking at the percentage of GDP that different countries spend on healthcare, Britain — though paying slightly less than Germany or France — spends more than most comparable European countries.

International comparisons for care workers are harder to find, though even in the pre-Boriswave days of 2019, Britain was one of the few European countries — along with Luxembourg, Malta, Ireland and Austria — where the share of migrants among care workers exceeded 10%.

Given these international comparisons, it seems likely that Britain simply can recruit from abroad due to the international availability of English-speaking workers, not that it must to the extent it does presently. Policy changes can still make a difference, though. Last spring, the Conservative government belatedly restricted the ability of Health and Care visa holders to bring dependents. This change, coupled with increased Home Office scrutiny, led to an 81% decrease in visas granted to main applicants in 2024 compared to the previous year. While the NHS and the care system aren’t functioning well, neither are they “collapsing” any more than they were in 2023.

These are not easy issues to solve: increasing reliance on foreign workers for health and care work is rooted in aging populations, as well as resulting workforce and financial constraints. It is an increasing trend worldwide; but as with many aspects of immigration, Britain is an extreme case and has handled it especially poorly in recent years. In this context, lazy claims of inevitable collapse simply don’t stand up to scrutiny.


Will Solfiac is a London-based writer focusing on subjects including the politics and history of immigration. He can be found on Substack.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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