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The AfD has destroyed Germany’s political mainstream

Björn Höcke, the AfD's leader in the state of Thuringia, addresses supporters earlier this month. Credit: Getty

September 2, 2024 - 1:00pm

This weekend’s regional elections in Saxony and Thuringia have revealed significant shifts in the German political landscape, reflecting a country grappling with multiple crises. Although these were only regional elections, their outcomes carry national implications, particularly given the participation of nearly three-quarters of the five-million electorate.

Berlin’s three governing parties received a combined total of around 10-13% of the vote. Meanwhile, the Right-wing Alternative for Germany (AfD) secured over 30% of the vote in both states, becoming the first party in Thuringia. Despite this strong showing the party remains isolated, as no other party is willing to form a coalition with it. This leaves the AfD in a paradoxical position: popular, but unable to translate its success into political power.

The main opposition party, the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU), maintained its hold on Saxony by a tiny margin. But the party now faces a choice: change, or continue to shed votes to the AfD. The CDU’s involvement in centrist coalitions, driven by the necessity of excluding the AfD, has diluted its political identity. Also paradoxically, the rise of the AfD has been fuelled precisely by the migration policies of former CDU chancellor Angela Merkel.

The CDU now finds itself weakened, unable to form coalitions without compromising its traditional stances or striking alliances that would have been unthinkable a few years ago. One such possible alliance is with the newly formed Left-populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) — an option that is currently being explored by both parties. Incredibly, the BSW is now the third-largest party in both states: an impressive feat for a party that was launched just a few months ago.

Sunday’s vote has confirmed that migration remains the “mother of all domestic policy problems”, and that the inability to manage migration effectively has eroded public trust in traditional parties. The AfD’s success can be attributed largely to its hardline stance on immigration, a position that has gained traction even among former Left-wing voters who now support Sahra Wagenknecht’s party.

This development suggests that migration will dominate the upcoming federal elections, turning them into a de facto referendum on Germany’s immigration policies. But opposition to the government’s belligerent approach to the Ukraine war clearly also played a role, especially among young people. Wagenknecht, in particular, has centred her platform around opposition to Nato, the deployment of US long-range missiles on German territory, and the question of détente with Russia.

The most interesting takeaway from the elections is probably the emergence of a new — and unique in the European panorama — Left-Right populist spectrum, in the form of the AfD and the BSW which collectively make up almost 50% of the vote. This underscores that dissatisfaction with the established parties is even more significant than what Right-populists parties alone are able to capture — a lesson for other countries as well.

For now, the BSW has ruled out forming regional coalition governments with the AfD, which is understandable from a tactical standpoint: many disaffected voters from the centre and the Left are turning to the BSW precisely because it is not the AfD. But in the future the mood might shift. If the establishment refuses to respond to popular concerns, the demand for a Left-Right populist front could grow. Meanwhile, the fact that both ends of the political spectrum are converging on similar migration policies suggests that the issue may be approached more pragmatically, rather than through the lens of morality.

The regional elections will surely serve as a wake-up call for Germany. They highlight the urgent need for political realignment and the dangers of ignoring the concerns of significant portions of the electorate. The implications extend beyond Germany, affecting its role in the European Union and the broader geopolitical landscape.


Thomas Fazi is an UnHerd columnist and translator. His latest book is The Covid Consensus, co-authored with Toby Green.

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