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Southport-style attacks don’t need a new terrorism definition

'The state must be careful about the difference between worrying activity and criminal activity.' Credit: Getty

'The state must be careful about the difference between worrying activity and criminal activity.' Credit: Getty

March 13 2025 - 6:00pm

To call something “terrorism” is to issue the most severe form of moral condemnation. This was evident in last year’s announcement that the UK Government would treat misogyny as a form of extremist terrorism and consequently mobilize a raft of anti-terror resources to tackle it. Meanwhile, many called for the Southport murders perpetrated by Axel Rudakubana in July to be labeled as terrorism. Some on the Right wanted to pin them on Islamic terrorism, citing the fact that the killer had previously downloaded an al-Qaeda manual. On the other hand, those on the Left wanted to brand the stabbings as terrorism on the basis that the act had terrorized.

Occupying the latter category was Prime Minister Keir Starmer, who in January raised the possibility of changing terrorism law to encompass violence which was non-ideological but which “clearly intended to terrorize”, as with Rudakubana’s rampage. To state what should be obvious, neither ingredient alone makes the Southport murders an act of terror.

In response, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, has today advised that no such change in definition is necessary. Hall recommended that terror laws should not apply to non-ideological violence, saying that the “legal definition of terrorism is already wide and should not be changed any further”. He cited various practical examples of why this should be the case, including the risks of false positives and the massive strain on both resources and public expectations.

Another welcome aspect of Hall’s reasoning is that freedom of expression should be protected, and expanding the definition of terrorism would risk creating unacceptable restrictions. He provided the example of people who share conflict footage, as well as those who are fascinated by violence but never act upon it. These are not crimes, and the state must be careful about the difference between worrying activity and criminal activity. It should also be noted that the UK does not have the security infrastructure or knowledge basis on which to determine who among those obsessed with online gore would ever dream of enacting something similar in the real world.

It is true that we need a word to describe politically motivated violence as distinct from private, personal or even public violence of the non-ideological kind. Changing the definition to encompass things which plainly aren’t terrorism by the classical definition would eventually lead to the realization that we need yet another new term for, well, terrorism.

Perhaps of greater consequence is Hall’s suggestion that the Government should consider a new offense, to respond to those planning mass casualty attacks even of the non-terroristic kind. This would grant police and security services powers similar to those under the Terrorism Act to intervene, and ensure potentially length prison sentences for those doing the planning.

In the case of Rudakubana, Prevent has been accused of failing to achieve something it was never meant to do: countering non-ideological violence. It is unclear what kind of interventions could have been made had Prevent taken on the case. There aren’t exactly “intervention providers” for people obsessed with genocide in the same way there are those equipped to challenge Islamist ideology. In reality, even with Prevent involvement, there is no guarantee his atrocity could have been averted — not least because the interventions aren’t compulsory. A new offense such as that proposed by the terrorism watchdog would allow the state to imprison someone should they reach the planning stage, rather than limply offering a few mentoring sessions to compete with constant consumption of extreme violence.

At the same time, it’s unclear that any such law could have stopped Rudakubana specifically, given he was not on authorities’ radar for plotting a mass killing. When he was deemed unsuitable for a counter-terrorism program, the Southport killer should have been triaged to existing services, and at the very least he should have received more than just a slap on the wrist for the multiple occasions on which he was involved in violent altercations or found carrying weapons.

This kind of ongoing and inexplicable leniency towards the repeatedly violent few is perhaps the greatest danger to public safety. Hall’s proposed law gets to the heart of the matter: imprisonment serves not only as punishment or rehabilitation for the criminal, but also as protection for the law-abiding public from those few dangerous individuals who would do us harm, given half the chance.


Liam Duffy is a researcher, speaker and trainer in counter-terrorism based in London.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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