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Sizewell C looks like an expensive mistake

A 'golden age' for nuclear investment? Credit: Getty

A 'golden age' for nuclear investment? Credit: Getty

June 11 2025 - 10:00am

Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Energy Secretary Ed Miliband maintain that their decision to commit a further $14 billion to Sizewell C, a new nuclear power station in Suffolk, does not represent a “blank check” from the taxpayer. Yet the evidence suggests this may be overly optimistic.

For a government that wants to achieve a Net Zero energy system by 2050, the attractions of Sizewell C are obvious. Unlike intermittent renewables, which are dependent on the weather, nuclear plants — in theory, at least — provide stable and reliable low carbon power. However, most of Britain’s existing nuclear fleet is aging fast and, despite repeated extensions of its operating licenses, will be offline by 2030. Meanwhile, back in 2020 the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) granted a license to build and operate two reactors at Sizewell with a total capacity of 3.2 gigawatts — enough to power some 6 million homes.

Sizewell’s license was granted on the basis that the new plant would be largely identical to Hinckley Point C, another two-reactor plant which is still being built by EDF in Gloucestershire. Though this was originally supposed to be supplying power to the grid by now, current projections suggest such an outcome is unlikely before 2031. When construction started in 2017, EDF said it would cost $18 billion at 2015 prices. Last year, following several earlier increases, the firm revised this figure to $34 billion at 2015 prices — or $46 billion now. Most energy experts consider it unlikely that Sizewell C will end up costing much less.

The operational record of the European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) design of the Sizewell and Hinckley Point plants is no happier. In 2021, the world’s first EPR to come online, Taishan 1 in China, had to be shut down for more than a year because unexpected vibrations had damaged its fuel rods. The same problem has afflicted the EPR at Flamanville in France, which has also experienced shutdowns. Other expensive technical issues there mean that EDF has decided to concentrate in future on selling a very different new design known as the EPR2.

However, the organization can’t do that at Sizewell C because this would not comply with the terms of the ONR license. Seeking approval for a British EPR2 would mean repeating the entire regulatory process, which would take several years.

This isn’t the only questionable feature of the Government’s decision. While EDF has clearly struggled to build nuclear plants on budget and on time, its Korean rival Kepco has to date built eight of its Advance Power Reactor (APR) 1400 plants without significant overruns. In 2023, Kepco submitted a bid to Turkey to build four reactors for a total cost of around $26 billion. On that basis, building two at Sizewell might be expected to cost $13 billion, less than a third of the likely cost of the EPRs.

What’s more, the APR 1400 has already been approved by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and by the European Union: its safety standards are no less stringent than those of Britain’s ONR.

“It would make an awful lot of sense if we junked the EPR and just went for Kepco,” independent energy consultant Kathryn Porter says. “If the APR is good enough for Europe and America, it’s good enough for us — and unlike the Americans, we don’t have to worry about hurricanes and tornadoes. We could literally just pass a law saying we’re going to build APR 1400s at Sizewell. And because they’re so much cheaper, they would attract investment — and make a profit.” Other sites where old reactors have already closed or are due to do so, such as Wylfa on Anglesey, would also be suitable, Porter says.

Starmer and Miliband claim that throwing another $14 billion at Sizewell C shows we are entering a new “golden age” of nuclear investment. Some may feel that opting for a technology known to be fraught with problems, and prone to vast increases in construction costs, is a peculiar way to go about this mission.


David Rose is UnHerd‘s Investigations Editor.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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