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New York Times changes its tune on lab-leak theory

'It would be naive to read this as representing an outbreak of truth.' Credit: Getty

'It would be naive to read this as representing an outbreak of truth.' Credit: Getty

March 17 2025 - 11:40am

Was the Covid-19 virus a chance case of animal-to-human transmission, or a deliberately engineered virus escaping from a gain of function laboratory? In the latest sign of a deep shift in America’s underlying political tectonics, the New York Times has published an op-ed complaining that “We were badly misled” about the origin of Covid-19. The lab-leak theory was always plausible, we’re now permitted to say; but groups of supposedly neutral and independent scientists colluded to produce independent-sounding denials, so as to make it seem like a fringe position. Now, apparently, we need “an honest conversation” so that nothing similar happens again.

It’s tempting just to respond with outrage to the pivot, when for so long it was the Times which led the charge in dismissing, politicizing, and vilifying the lab-leak theory. But if we take the Grey Lady’s stance on any given topic less as objective fact than a primer for respectable chattering-class opinion among America’s coastal elite, over time its own reporting supplies a tacit explanation for why the official line has now firmly changed. In short: the NYT has embraced the deterioration in US-China relations.

Back in January, the Times reported on a change in position at the CIA on the origins of Covid. The reporter is at pains to emphasize that Joe Biden commissioned the report which has changed the Agency’s line, from which we are presumably to infer that this is not mere Trumpaganda. But the same article also suggests that the Biden administration was keen for the Covid virus not to be a lab leak — not least because the global political ramifications were so immense.

This was all contested early in the pandemic: in February 2020 the US State Department summoned the Chinese ambassador to protest statements made by Beijing, according to which the virus was a US military project. Republican Senator Tom Cotton, meanwhile, claimed shortly after that the virus was a Chinese bioweapon, a statement the NYT dismissed at the time as “fringe”. Both sides must have recoiled from pressing the point; but the more general one was made again in official 2023 hearings by John Ratcliffe, then Director of National Intelligence and now head of the CIA., when he pointed out a lab leak would have “enormous geopolitical implications”.

What would it do to relations between Washington and Beijing for China to have released a virus that killed over a million Americans — especially if it was created as a bioweapon to begin with? Lately, it appears that the US is preparing to lean into those implications: following the CIA’s change of stance, Cotton has called for the Trump administration to “make China pay for unleashing a plague on the world”.

But especially in light of just how coordinated the earlier efforts were to suppress the lab-leak theory, it would be naive to read this as representing an outbreak of truth. Rather, it more likely just reflects America’s hardening stance in relation to China. The recent pandemonium in Europe concerning Russia and Ukraine can be understood in the same light: as second-order effects of a US decision to deprioritize European security, in order to focus resources on its perceived chief great-power rival, China. Analysts have likewise argued that Trump’s stance toward Putin can be understood in the same light: as a “reverse Nixon”, aiming to peel Russia away from alliance with China.

In other words, the Grey Lady’s change of official stance in relation to lab leaks has little to do with “honest conversation”, and much to do with shifts in the broader geopolitical picture — especially in relation to China. We may never know if the virus was a military project, or whose. But what should be clear is that America’s rivalry with China has now hardened to a point where the lab-leak theory, once marginalized through official collusion, is crystallizing as a propaganda talking-point for the same institutions that previously buried it.


Mary Harrington is a contributing editor at UnHerd.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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