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MI5 still doesn’t understand Islamic terrorism

MI5 Director-General Ken McCallum speaks yesterday. Credit: MI5/X

MI5 Director-General Ken McCallum speaks yesterday. Credit: MI5/X

October 9 2024 - 11:00am

‘MI5 has one hell of a job on its hands.’ That was the warning yesterday from the agency’s Director-General, Ken McCallum, in a speech which touched on everything from Russian espionage to Iranian assassination plots, and from the present competition with China to the violent echoes of last century’s conflict in Northern Ireland.

On counterterrorism, McCallum gave the ‘headline split’ of ‘75% Islamist terrorism, 25% extreme Right-wing.’ Despite delving into the shifting ideological configurations of the violence, McCallum underlined that the threat of most concern is still that posed by al-Qaeda and Islamic State.

It may be surprising to hear that al-Qaeda warrants a mention in 2024, but some of the old guard are indeed still knocking around. We do not yet know the implications of Afghanistan’s fall to the Taliban in 2021, while in August an al-Qaeda affiliate slaughtered several hundred civilians in Burkina Faso.

But what of plots in Britain and Europe? In March Islamic State unleashed a Bataclan-style massacre in Moscow, killing over 130 people, while in August a plot to kill audience members at a Taylor Swift concert was intercepted in Vienna. Islamic State’s appetite to unleash mass murder in European capitals has evidently not abated, though most of these cases are linked to IS operatives overseas.

Beneath these more sophisticated plots, there is the ongoing drumbeat of stabbing attacks across Europe, usually perpetrated by lone actors. While reported at the time, these leave little impression on the psyche of the societies they afflict. They are forgotten and moved on from as quickly as they unfolded, largely because of a widespread discomfort about addressing Islamist extremism. It is especially true when such a high proportion of perpetrators are recent arrivals to the continent, with many linked to asylum claims — as was the case of the knifeman who murdered three at a festival in Solingen, Germany in August.

In the face of this brand of violence, public institutions adopt a strategy of avoidance, for fear of empowering a ‘far-Right narrative’, but it should be obvious by now that the failure of liberal institutions to confront Islamist terrorism is what drives the Right-wing narrative.

Another factor behind the muted reaction to the semi-regular stabbings and killings is confusion, by virtue of an undercurrent which confounds the traditional lenses for identifying Islamist terror. What authorities mean by Islamist terror tends to mean Salafi-jihadists: namely al-Qaeda and Islamic State. But closer inspection reveals a relatively new strain of Islamist terrorism in the truest sense of the term: individuals acting out of a perceived irreconcilable clash between their Islamist worldview and the West, or in reaction to the crossing of Islamist moral red lines, without neatly defined ties to the Salafi-jihadist worldview or propaganda consumption to which we have become accustomed.

In 2022 there was the 44-year-old Blackburn man who took hostages at a Texas synagogue while demanding the release of Aafia Siddiqui, an al-Qaeda operative and cause célèbre for British Islamist activists. There was Edward Little, who that same year sought to kill former Muslim-turned-Christian preacher Hatun Tash for her perceived blasphemy, as well as the 2023 murder of a pensioner in Hartlepool in a claimed revenge attack over Gaza. There was the Batley schoolteacher who was forced into hiding in 2021 for showing caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad, a chilling reminder of the murder of Samuel Paty by an Islamic terrorist in France the previous year.

When a jihadist attacks and their devices are analysed, Islamic State propaganda may be found. These are clear and quantifiable data points. In the absence of such evidence, the permeation of Islamist ideology throughout society and its acceptance by individuals willing to commit violence on its behalf is less straightforward. So when perpetrators do not fit neatly into the Salafi-jihadist bucket, other angles such as mental health or ‘mixed, unclear, or unstable ideology’ are liable to elbow their way into the analysis.

MI5 is already alert to Russian and Chinese influence operations, but security services have largely been spared tackling another ongoing influence campaign which equally seeks to subvert British democracy and increasingly manifests as violence on the streets of Europe — that of global Islamism. Unfortunately for the already stretched McCallum and his colleagues, the task of protecting British democracy and reducing violence will not be possible until this changes.


Liam Duffy is a researcher, speaker and trainer in counter-terrorism based in London.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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