“Bienvenue à Berlin,” said a smiling Friedrich Merz as he greeted Emmanuel Macron last night in the German capital. A firm handshake and a hearty hug followed, with the German Chancellor and the French President visibly keen to convey that they get along well. The warmth between them is genuine, but is it enough to bridge the deep rifts emerging between their countries?

Merz certainly wants to move on from the notoriously frosty relations his predecessor Olaf Scholz had with Macron. Instead of inviting the Frenchman to the chancellery, Merz arranged for a “working dinner” at the Villa Borsig, a beautiful lakeside mansion that served as the residence of the French military governor in occupied Berlin — a potent symbol of reconciliation. “We stand on the foundations of a close Franco-German relationship that has grown over decades,” Merz told the media. “Both of us see it as a great duty to continue to work on it for years to come.”

Few would doubt that Merz and Macron really want a “fresh start” for Franco-German relations. The common challenges facing Europe are huge. Ahead of the meeting, Merz mentioned that a solution for the ongoing trade negotiations with the US might be nigh. However, there are other, much more contentious issues between Berlin and Paris in crucial areas, such as defence integration, energy security and their vision for Europe.

In theory, both Germany and France agree that European countries must invest more in their own security while reducing dependency on the US. At their last meeting in May, when Merz visited Paris on his first day in office, they announced the creation of a Franco-German Defence and Security Council. There is also a push on joint programmes such as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS). But friction remains. France demands intellectual and industrial leadership over the project, with its companies arguing that they have more experience in the field.

Macron also continues to push for European “strategic autonomy” anchored in France’s nuclear deterrent. Germany, which doesn’t have its own nuclear weapons, has long had a strong military relationship with the US. Merz, despite having made huge debt-sourced funds available for German rearmament, insists Nato remains central. As a staunch transatlanticist, he argues France’s nuclear role must complement, rather than replace, the American umbrella.

Meanwhile, Berlin and Paris are diametrically opposed on energy policy. France creates nearly 70% of its electricity from nuclear power and is lobbying the EU to label the sector as “green”, which would then make it eligible for subsidies and beneficial legislation. Germany, having exited nuclear entirely in 2023, has resisted, banking on gas imports instead. Merz’s administration, though critical of the phase-out completed under Scholz, has ruled out reversing the decision. This has vast implications for security and supply within an increasingly integrated electricity market in the EU, where German industry ramps up its imports when the sun doesn’t shine enough and there isn’t enough wind to create what it needs from renewables.

There is more alignment on trade policy. Both Paris and Berlin want to prepare Europe for a tougher, more fragmented global economy with increased autonomy from the US, Russia and China. This pragmatic shift has revived the E3 format between Germany, France, and Britain, as emphasised in recent meetings between UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer with Macron and Merz. But there is a risk that this format neglects Poland. As Germany and France deepen ties with London, Poland — Europe’s rising power in defence and diplomacy — is conspicuously absent. Recent presidential elections there were won by the conservative candidate Karol Nawrocki, who has been critical of Germany and the EU. Keeping Poland on side, especially when it comes to defence, will be crucial.

The “Merzcron” relationship is a far cry from the cold mutual suspicion between Scholz and the French President. But all the hugging and backslapping can’t detract from the divergence of national interests. Personal chemistry and shared ambition can smooth over tensions — but they can’t erase the deeper structural divides that shape each country’s vision of Europe.

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Katja Hoyer is a German-British historian and writer. She is the author, most recently, of Beyond the Wall: East Germany, 1949-1990.

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