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Liberals still don’t understand Britain’s immigration anger

‘A country in which only 3% of the population says you have to be white to be truly British is hardly returning to the late Sixties.’ Credit: Getty

‘A country in which only 3% of the population says you have to be white to be truly British is hardly returning to the late Sixties.’ Credit: Getty

September 10 2025 - 3:00pm

The Overton window on immigration has been flung so wide open that the idea of mass deportations is now part of the mainstream.

It’s only natural that some liberal-minded people are alarmed by this, especially those who have built their politics around openness and diversity. It is also only natural to look for bad actors behind the shift in rhetoric and opinion, which is said to have driven last year’s Southport riots, this year’s hotel protests, and the Raise the Colors movement.

Many liberal commentators blame the emerging mood on the critics of recent trends rather than the trends themselves: massive unselective legal immigration, highly visible illegal flows, a sense of disorder and criminality associated with some recent arrivals, the dramatic shift in Britain’s ethnic balance in just 25 years, and the return of the grooming gangs scandal.

Another example of blaming the messenger was published last week in the New Statesman. In a piece entitled “The age of deportation”, Tanjil Rashid asserts that the idea of mass deportation changes what it means to be British. He adds, in the accompanying podcast, that ex-MP Douglas Carswell — who does indeed say objectionable things about deporting all British Muslims — is “driving the agenda” of a Right echoing Enoch Powell’s ethnonationalism.

It is true that Nigel Farage’s aim of deporting 600,000 people who are here illegally is not something that would have been said a year ago. But why does sheer scale change the meaning of being British unless you think that deportation of illegal immigrants is itself un-British (beyond the current tiny numbers)? Rashid’s answer is an oddly old-fashioned one, based on an idea of Britain/England as something which isn’t really a place at all but instead “a grand confluence”, a crossroads-cum-melting pot with a “global identity”.

This takes us back to the Seventies and Eighties and publications such as Race and Class. The editor Ambalavaner Sivanandan — quoted by Rashid — took Britain’s pre-national imperial identity, still strong enough to inform the 1948 Act that granted citizenship to all people of the Empire and Commonwealth, and flipped it into a post-national, multicultural one. Under both regimes, we become interchangeable units outside of any particular national culture.

No other modern nation thinks like this. But it does help to explain the complexities and diffidence of England’s national identity, at least at the elite level, for so long subsumed within both Britain and Empire.

Rashid blurs the lines between racists and those with legitimate concerns about the scale and speed of immigration. The latter are just expressing a normal yearning for a national home with controlled borders. Such people aren’t against immigration in principle; they merely want moderate inflows and immigrants who pay their way and merge their own traditions with British ones. Instead, he gives succor to a naïve universalist idea of the country, one that is uneasy with a confident English identity.

Social tensions are on the rise and far-Right activists have played a role in recent protests. But the anti-racism taboo remains one of the strongest in British society — on the Right as well as the Left. Carswell’s “deport all Muslims” rhetoric is not mainstream. And who with influence on the Right supports this idea of a “pure English nation”? Kemi Badenoch? Zia Yusuf?

A country in which only 3% of the population says you have to be white to be truly British — yes there are still some racists — is hardly returning to the late Sixties. When I interviewed Farage on the 50th anniversary of the “Rivers of Blood” speech, he said that, though he was a Powellite in his youth, he now believed Ted Heath had been right to sack Powell from the Tory front bench. It was, he said, the brutality of Powell’s rhetoric that prevented a serious, hard-headed debate about immigration for three decades.

The rise of Reform UK and the hardening of rhetoric is a response to the failures of mainstream politics, especially over immigration and issues of national sovereignty and identity. It is not some monster from the Powellite basement that has awoken from its slumber.


David Goodhart is the author of The Care Dilemma: Freedom, Family, Fertility, which is published in paperback on 11 September 2025. He is head of the Demography unit at the think tank Policy Exchange.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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