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Has the internet made us less conscientious?

Who needs friends? Credit: Getty

Who needs friends? Credit: Getty

August 12 2025 - 10:30am

John Burn-Murdoch recently observed in the Financial Times that, over the past several decades, there has been a shift in personality: less conscientiousness, fewer self-identified extroverts, and rising neuroticism, particularly among the young. While acknowledging that there are multiple reasons behind this turn, Burn-Murdoch is right to point the finger at the online world in particular.

Online life has fundamentally altered how we live and interact, making us at once more connected than at any point in history and less connected in the ways that matter most. The resulting loss of face-to-face relationships may help explain why traits such as reliability and sociability appear to be eroding.

Meanwhile, work and school — two of the institutions that most structure our days — have undergone profound technological transformations since the 2000s, which have been expedited and exacerbated by the pandemic. According to Pew Research, over one-third of all workers who can work from home all the time do so, up from only 7% pre-pandemic. And more classrooms use technology than ever before. While 30% of US school districts had high-speed broadband in 2013, nearly 90% did by 2016.

The internet delivers exceptional reach, but digital connections can be shallow and easily abandoned. One way in which these developments may be damaging conscientiousness — which Burn-Murdoch describes as “the quality of being dependable and disciplined” — is the erosion of informal accountability. In physical classrooms and offices, showing up on time, contributing to discussions, and meeting deadlines are visible to peers and supervisors alike.

These small but constant pressures reinforce conscientious behavior, pressures which are weaker in online environments. In leaked audio earlier this year, JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon voiced his frustration that employees both complained about returning to in-person work yet showed up for Zoom meetings with cameras off, if they showed up at all. Dimon — as head of the most important financial institution in the world — has obvious credibility on what makes for an effective workforce.

At the same time, real-world connections have contracted sharply. Compared to 20 years ago, American Time Use Survey data shows that people are spending much less time face-to-face. In 2024, 30% of Americans were likely to engage in socializing and communicating on an average day, compared with 38% in 2014, and the amount of time spent doing so decreased as well.

Practically, of course, the world is not going to abandon the internet. But it’s telling that people want to use it less. “Digital detoxes” are trending, and studies have found that young people would prefer a world entirely without the internet.

Arresting the decline in conscientiousness and sociability will require more than reducing individual screen time. Bans on phone use in schools could be broadened to dial down all tech use in the classroom, while employers could follow Dimon’s lead by encouraging in-person days — or, at least, promoting hybrid arrangements that maximize in-person contact.

The internet has made it possible to be in touch with more people than ever before. But it has also made it easier to avoid the kinds of encounters that once bound us together. If the medium is shaping the message, it may also be shaping us — and not always for the better.


Carolyn D. Gorman is a Fellow at the Manhattan Institute.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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