June 3, 2024 - 7:00am

Last week S&P Global downgraded France’s credit rating from AA to AA-, hammering the final nail in the coffin of the Macron presidency. Emmanuel Macron won as a competent technocrat and a former investment banker who would manage France’s economy with ease. Now, nearly halfway through his presidential term, France appears to be slipping into bankruptcy.

France’s deficit was 5.5% of GDP in 2023, and it is expected to remain high at 4.9% of GDP in 2024 and 2025. The country currently has the fourth largest government deficit in Europe, and at around 110% of GDP, the third largest debt-to-GDP ratio. The Maastricht criteria rules that govern membership of the single currency set an overall debt limit of 60% of GDP and a deficit limit of 3%. Now, France has more than double the allowed debt load and almost double the deficit.

Macron has found himself caught in the same bind as many other centrists in Europe: they state publicly that they want to provide economic stewardship, but they keep getting caught up in economically destructive policies. The two main causes of France’s current woes are the costs imposed, first by the lockdowns, then by the high energy prices driven by the sanctions and counter-sanctions associated with the war in Ukraine.

Recently, the French president floated the idea of sending troops to Ukraine. This would presumably move France very close to a state of war with Russia. But with its soaring deficit and debt load, how would France afford such a war? It obviously could not. This is the problem with so many “sensible” centrist politicians today: their policies make absolutely no economic sense, but they are driven to commit to them regardless because they feel the need to identify with other centrists on emotive issues like the war.

Last year, the Macron government pushed through pension reforms in the face of protests and deeply entrenched opposition in the public. The reforms raised the eligible pension age from 62 to 64. Yet clearly, looking at the government deficit numbers, these reforms have made little financial difference. Again, this is because in comparison to the economically destructive policies these politicians feel compelled to adopt, policies like the French pension reform are merely a drop in the bucket.

In fact, France is now in a position where a recession could easily bankrupt the country. Consider that in 2008, the French government deficit was 3.5% of GDP. As the country fell into recession in 2009, the deficit rose to 7.4% of GDP. If we saw a similar increase due to a recession this year or next, France would have a deficit of nearly 10% of GDP — by far the largest the country would have had since WWII.

It is not surprising that Macron is deeply unpopular in France. At the start of his presidential term in 2022, the French president was polling above 40%. This has now fallen to 30%. Liberal centrists like Macron must accept the fact that there are serious trade-offs when it comes to their desires to get involved in global conflict. A European politician today cannot support deeper involvement in global conflict and pursue an agenda of economic growth and stewardship. Likewise, they cannot remain electorally popular and remain in the good graces of their fellow war enthusiasts. These politicians need to decide who their constituency actually is.


Philip Pilkington is a macroeconomist and investment professional, and the author of The Reformation in Economics

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