January 1, 2025 - 2:00pm

China’s economy has become something of a Rorschach test. The 5% growth target for 2024 that Xi Jinping yesterday said the country had met? One set of economists looks at it and says the economy is collapsing, the figures are probably fudged, and that a recession is likely to begin this year anyhow. The other side says the government is probably right, and that while Beijing’s economy is slowing, these problems may be overcome in 2025. They can’t both be right, even if they both have a point. But the camp to which you belong to appears to be determined by where you sit.

Western analysts, using aggregate data and a liberal interpretative lens, tend to see China’s economy as beset with insurmountable structural obstacles embedded in Communist Party rule. Because the leadership is reluctant to give more political power to the people as their incomes rise, the CCP persists with an industrial development model based on repressing wages to boost investment in export-manufacturing industries. Unable as a result to break out of the middle-income trap, which would require shifting towards an economy based on domestic consumption, the regime has consequently left itself vulnerable to the coming wave of Donald Trump’s tariffs. Then, the thinking goes, the economy may enter a real crisis.

However, economists based in or near China — even when working for Western firms — tend to eschew such pessimism. Observing close-hand the extraordinary innovation and dynamism of Chinese firms, and the rapid emergence of new sectors which are out-competing Western rivals, they’re more inclined to think the Chinese are capable of rising to these challenges. But if they agree that the country can continue to grow at the rate targeted by the regime, they’re not yet sure it will.

The basic challenge is that China has more or less saturated the world market with its products, and now accounts for about a third of the planet’s industrial output. As the phenomenal growth of its manufacturing sector has come largely at the expense of its trading partners, notably but not only Western countries, there is little appetite among other countries to keep absorbing more of China’s surplus. So if the rest of the world puts limits on how much it will buy from Beijing, the Chinese will have to start consuming more of their own output.

This is broadly agreed to be the crux of the matter. The split into camps occurs over whether Beijing can engineer that transformation. Sceptics doubt the Communist Party under Xi will ever countenance a “welfarist” model which allows its citizens more economic power. They point to the long list underwhelming announcements, and to policies which continue to favour supply-side stimulus, such as industrial and export subsidies.

But word on New Year’s Eve that civil servants had received a pay rise may hint that the government is finally preparing bolder measures than before. While the CCP’s proposed demand-side stimulus measures have so far remained relatively conceptual, they may nonetheless indicate a new direction of travel.

The leadership will probably wait until Trump takes office later this month and launches his first move against China before revealing just how far it will go to stimulate the economy with domestic consumption. But for now, it’s probably best to hold off the obituaries for the Chinese transformation. Reports of the death of Chinese growth are likely to be greatly exaggerated.


John Rapley is an author and academic who divides his time between London, Johannesburg and Ottawa. His books include Why Empires Fall: Rome, America and the Future of the West (with Peter Heather, Penguin, 2023) and Twilight of the Money Gods: Economics as a religion (Simon & Schuster, 2017).

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