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Britain’s old university order is breaking down

A new report has suggested student numbers should be cut by 30% to save universities. Credit: Getty

A new report has suggested student numbers should be cut by 30% to save universities. Credit: Getty

June 13 2026 - 8:00am

Hardly a week goes by without universities appearing in the news. Whether it is the debt burden confronting graduates, academic departments being shut down, or business-style mergers across institutions struggling to remain afloat, the sector is in trouble. And that is before you get to the swaths of cuts across the sector, tighter border restrictions squeezing the inflow of foreign students, and universities accepting students without academic qualifications, along with the relentless subversion of academic freedom on campus.

Responding to this multi-pronged assault, the think tank Policy Exchange published a report this week entitled “Tarnished Towers”, in which it advocates that national student numbers be cut by 30%. Arguably, this process is already underway as young people change their minds on higher education. A recent poll showed that 34% of respondents believe a university education “just isn’t worth the time and money it usually takes” — up from 14% in 2005. Meanwhile, 27% of graduates themselves believe the same. This is despite 36% still believing that people who go to university end up being a lot better off financially, down from 50% in 2005. All this comes as the graduate premium — the supposed boost to average pay over an individual’s lifetime flowing from higher education — is eaten away by a labor market saturated with graduates, each of whom is burdened by higher levels of student debt.

The modern British university system constitutes a shiny adornment of the now outmoded model of the world’s political economy. As peak globalization recedes into the past, its key institutions are also under pressure, of which newly marketized universities were integral. As industries shifted overseas, universities were expected to soak up the excess labor by creating a majority white-collar workforce, constituting service-sector employees. Against this backdrop, universities’ expanded campuses would act as the new economic hubs for deindustrialized towns and cities. Tony Blair is widely criticized for his aim to get half of school leavers into higher education, but the process started before him, when John Major converted Britain’s old polytechnic colleges into universities.

But the overall aim was not just to reshape the national economy. Universities were also intended to act as vehicles of socialization for this new order. Campus accommodation would detach students from their families and communities, and better prepare them for a life of submitting to human resources training and bureaucratic obedience.

Now, a reckoning for the old order is underway. As inflation, tariffs and growing geopolitical risk eat away at over-extended global supply chains, the pressure to reshore industry and seek energy self-sufficiency will tilt the advantage back to blue-collar work in trades at the expense of white-collar office work.

The dissolution of the monasteries under the Henrician Reformation was an integral part of Britain’s emergence from feudalism into the modern era. It helped to break up a powerful, seditious elite with transnational loyalties, whose institutions tied up resources that could be more productively employed elsewhere. If Britain has to reconstitute itself as an independent nation-state in the aftermath of globalization, and if the dissolution of the universities, our latter-day monasteries, is upon us, perhaps this can also liberate academics. As universities became less economically important, instead of serving as administrative functionaries and trainers of a globalist salariat, academics can once again return to pursuing a vocational role in research and teaching.


Philip Cunliffe is Associate Professor of International Relations at the Department of Risk and Disaster Reduction, University College London. He is the author of seven books, including, most recently: The National Interest: Politics after Globalization.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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