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Do British prisons really have an Islamophobia problem?

Muslim inmates constitute 18% of Britain's total prison population. Credit: Getty

Muslim inmates constitute 18% of Britain's total prison population. Credit: Getty

April 30 2025 - 4:45pm

There is no question that Britain’s prisons are becoming more violent. Figures published last week show assaults on staff and prisoners at record levels. The Muslim charity Maslaha has claimed that force used by prison staff to quell the rising tide is fuelled by “Islamophobia” and is a result of the racialized policing of the landings across eight of the nine prisons it surveyed. Is this an accurate or fair representation of the problem?

In a word: no. First, there’s the question of context. Prison assaults are overwhelmingly committed by prisoners on other inmates. In the last 12 months, there have been over 20,000 such assaults — roughly twice as many as the number of assaults on staff. Violence is endemic in prisons and staff have a duty to intervene when inmates are being attacked by others, as well as using force to protect themselves.

Meanwhile, frontline officers are reeling after a violent attack on three colleagues just before Easter by Hashem Abedi, a prisoner who plotted the 2017 Manchester Arena bombing. Eye-watering sickness absence rates from stress and acute recruitment and retention problems tell their own story. This is not a safe environment to work in.

To manage this onslaught, officers — with the same powers on duty as police constables — are trained to use physical control and restraint. They are equipped with rigid bar cuffs, batons and, in some prisons, incapacitant spray. Maslaha has used Freedom of Information requests to compare use-of-force data across a range of prisons with significant Muslim populations to assert that the disproportionality evident is racist.

At 18% of the total headcount, Muslims are significantly overrepresented in the UK’s disordered prison system relative to their share of the general population (6.5%). This is a fact which should detain criminologists and policymakers, but it is not proven in this analysis that disproportionality is discrimination.

In some of Britain’s high-security prisons, holding the most dangerous offenders, Muslims born in the faith or who convert for safety or power comprise between one third and almost half the population, so this disparity is significantly reduced. In addition, there is well-documented evidence of coercive behavior by Muslim gangs, admitted both by the prison service in its own research and in the findings of the Government’s independent watchdog on terrorism legislation. A picture therefore emerges that provides at least a counter-narrative to the emotional reasoning present in the Maslaha report.

The charity’s approach to this data constitutes a conclusion in search of evidence. When it considers the use of physical restraint and incapacitant spray, it talks up the exceptionally rare severe effects of using either type of force and talks down the distinction between drawing and using spray. Often, the demonstration of a willingness to use force by prison staff in dangerous situations is enough to cause prisoners to back off and for order to be regained. There is no control for the many situational or behavioral variables that impact the use of force by officers. A crude aggregation of the incidents versus population excludes where force is used preemptively, defensively, or as an intervention to rescue prisoners under attack. No data is offered on the ethnicity of officers involved, either.

There are no doubt some racist officers on the front lines of prisons, as there are racist people in all walks of life. But this piece of research is so clouded by partiality that it cannot be taken seriously. It certainly won’t contribute to once again making British prisons ordered and controlled places where all are safe regardless of religion or ethnicity, and where rehabilitation is a reality. The real problem here is an environment in our most challenging prisons where the state is not in charge and broken officers, traduced and targeted for asserting any authority, leave in droves.


Ian Acheson is a former prison governor and author of Screwed: Britain’s Prison Crisis and How To Escape it.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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