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Big Data can’t save policing from political correctness

'This project may be only the first of a new wave of political attempts at “neutral” buck-passing.' Credit: Getty

'This project may be only the first of a new wave of political attempts at “neutral” buck-passing.' Credit: Getty

April 11 2025 - 10:00am

Britain is developing its own Minority Report-style crime prediction tool, according to investigators from privacy campaign group Statewatch. The project, commissioned by the Prime Minister’s Office under Rishi Sunak, collates demographic, health, and crime data to “review offender characteristics that increase the risk of committing homicide”.

Campaigners have called the project “chilling and dystopian”, while the Guardian worried that “the data used would build bias into the predictions against minority-ethnic and poor people”. But this use of “bias” in turn exposes the conflicting political constraints on policing in modern Britain: a predicament which points to the role our post-liberal governing technocracy perhaps hopes Big Data will play, in helping them avoid confronting such conflicts directly.

“Bias” in the statistical sense describes the many ways a dataset can be skewed or inaccurate, resulting in false inferences. The problem with data bias, from a statistician’s perspective, is the risk of drawing inaccurate conclusions. By contrast, in the sense employed by the Guardian, “bias” denotes any generalization from data that might negatively single out a marginalized group. So a tool which suggested minority-ethnic or poor people were more likely to commit homicide would be guilty of “bias” — even if these predictions were based on accurate data produced using methodologically sound statistical analysis.

The potential for conflict between these competing types of “bias” should be obvious. In the context of existing UK homicide data, it is very clear indeed. For we don’t need a big Government database project to show that disparities exist — along lines which potentially set statisticians on a collision course with social justice campaigners. The most recent ONS homicide data release shows that 92% of those convicted of homicide were male, while 40% were aged 16-24. The group most overrepresented — by a factor of five, relative to their proportion of the overall population — was young black men. Victims are also disproportionately likely to be young men, with young black men especially at risk.

The difficulty is that policy in this area pulls in two mutually exclusive directions. On the one hand, everybody wants safe streets and a low murder rate. But on the other, everyone also wants fair treatment regardless of background. These two imperatives drive conflicting pressures both toward policing approaches which focus on at-risk demographics, and also against policing approaches that give an impression of unfairly profiling minorities.

Indeed, we might observe that the Metropolitan Police was already using a data-driven approach to homicide “risk assessment” and prevention back in 2014. The policy was “stop and search”, which was restricted in 2021 following protests over the pervasive impression it produced among those targeted, of unfair and race-inflected profiling and police harassment. In its application, and the resulting protests, we can see the two competing meanings of “bias” at loggerheads.

Reasonable people can of course disagree on whether stop and search actually worked. In principle, in a statistical sense, there is nothing “biased” about targeting preventive policing measures wherever a given crime is most prevalent. But considering the demographic specifics in this case, in the Guardian sense of “bias” this targeting was transparently, outrageously biased. Taken together, these competing imperatives put the Met in an impossible situation. We might wonder, then, whether the point of the “risk assessment” data tool commissioned under Sunak was not actually to provide police with new insights about homicide probabilities but to resolve these mutually exclusive pressures, by handing the probabilistic assessment to a supposedly “neutral” digital third party.

Sunak, a technocrat by disposition, perhaps hoped the public would perceive such a tool to be, as a non-human, less at risk of taint by the increasingly dour and partisan identity politics which have come to characterize Britain. If so, this project may be only the first of a new wave of political attempts at “neutral” buck-passing. That is, efforts to de-politicize intractably political issues, as a previous generation attempted with quangos, just this time using AI. And the response from Statewatch and the Guardian should give an early indicator of how well that’s going to work — which is to say, not at all.

Perhaps, eventually, Britain’s leaders will learn the hard way that political problems require political solutions. Unhappily, it seems we are still nowhere near that moment of realization yet.


Mary Harrington is a contributing editor at UnHerd.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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