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Covent Garden sale: another sign of Britain’s declining power

Christmas decorations at Covent Garden Market. Credit: Getty

Christmas decorations at Covent Garden Market. Credit: Getty

March 23 2025 - 1:15pm

This week, it was reported that Norway’s sovereign wealth fund has bought a quarter of London’s Covent Garden real estate for $570 million. The news comes just two months after Norges purchased a $306 million stake in the capital’s coveted Mayfair district from the Duke of Westminster. Norway’s central bank even owns a shopping center in Sheffield. So what is going on here?

These locations are merely part of a long list of lucrative British assets which have been bought by overseas governments and companies. That list includes offshore energy sites, regional airports, cyber security operations, British Steel, Thames Water and further crucial infrastructure.

London, the proverbial family silver, has been increasingly sold off in recent years. Over 50% of offices in the City are now owned by foreign investors. Oxford Street, the capital’s iconic shopping district, is dominated by overseas capital. The build-to-rent boom, exploiting the housing crisis, is increasingly driven by money from global institutional investors.

The London fire sale is not a bug but a feature of Britain’s national economic system. To fuel unaffordable spending and avoid rampant inflation, the value of London’s assets (and those of other major UK cities) needs to be kept artificially high. That means encouraging scarcity and allowing for rampant rentierism.

London is a window into a wider problem. The sad truth is that Britain still has a lot of wealth in it, but it is increasingly not our own. Instead of being the workshop of the world, we have become the world’s safe deposit box.

At the heart of this was a disastrous policy decision which only fantasy economics could conceive. Politicians and economists came to believe that it was not important for the UK to remain a producer country with a trade surplus. That, they thought, was a mug’s game: just keep spending and the money would be found, and the global market would balance itself out.

In 1978, exports were equivalent to 20% of UK GDP. By the late Nineties, this had fallen by a quarter to 15%. Shockingly, the last year when the UK had more money coming in from overseas earnings than it had to pay out for imports was in 1983. The cumulative deficit since that year is $1.3 trillion, equivalent to roughly $20,000 for every person alive in the UK today. It does not take an economist to figure out that if you keep going like this, you are not going to stay wealthy for long.

Unsurprisingly, to pay for everything we have bought from overseas, from avocados to zinc, the rest of the world has asked for something in return. This is why British property is being snapped up by overseas investors, why businesses are increasingly foreign-owned, and why a quarter of all UK Government debt is owned overseas.

To take one example, the total stock of business share capital and reserves owned by overseas investors has increased by $500 billion in the last four years. This matters because these businesses are our future income. It’s like a worker sacrificing a portion of their salary from five years in the future so that they can buy something today. This may not be too damaging as a one-off, but doing it every year for 40 years will lead to bankruptcy. Worryingly, the Government’s recently published Industrial Strategy is essentially a brochure for global investors to come and buy our most productive and profitable assets. The fire sale continues to avoid painful choices at home.

This weak financial position is also why the UK remains in a perpetual state of austerity and high inflation. Everyone agrees that we are not investing enough, but at the same time we are selling off the very means of investment to fuel our day-to-day needs. What’s more, Britain’s tax base is losing people to the benefits system and old age, yet public services won’t pay for themselves.

If the UK is to become wealthy again, it will take more than just a few wealth funds. It requires bold choices such as living within our means and increasing taxes in the short term on British consumers to subsidize the export industries we have run down over previous decades. It would require a new realism on ownership of British assets, supporting domestic ownership as much as possible.

This is not a call for autarky. Trade and investment is good, even necessary in a perfect world. But it needs to be balanced: the British people should benefit from the returns on our most lucrative assets. If the correction doesn’t start soon, we’ll need to find a few spare Covent Gardens to sell each year.


Andrew OBrien is the former Director of Policy at the think tank Demos and currently Head of Secretariat of the Independent Commission on Neighbourhoods. He writes in a personal capacity.

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China is threatening America in the AI race

Reports sugget Zhipu AI  has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

Reports sugget Zhipu AI has released a new model that can rival leading US systems. Credit: Getty

July 1 2026 - 10:18am

China is trying to catch up with America on artificial intelligence. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Zhipu AI — one of China’s six “AI tiger” LLMs — has released a new model that can rival leading US systems, including Anthropic’s Mythos, in cybersecurity tasks such as pinpointing security bugs. While this marks a milestone in China’s drive to catch up with Western AI capabilities, strong performance on a single benchmark does not mean it has taken the lead. Chinese models still lag behind their Western counterparts in broader capabilities, such as autonomous operation. Skepticism is therefore warranted before resorting to hysterical conclusions, but complacency about the geopolitical implications of China’s AI advances would be an even greater mistake.

On the infrastructure side, Chinese AI is still constrained by access to advanced chips, with American labs way ahead in computing capacity as well as investment. Analysis from earlier this year suggests that Chinese models are likely to be at least a few months behind those in the US. But they are still continuing to make progress, or that the geopolitical importance of AI will be decided only by whose LLM has ventured deeper into the technological frontier. The practical applications of AI, countries’ to capture foreign markets, and the application of AI into the real economy will matter just as much.

Here, China may hold an advantage. As with its dominance across many critical supply chains, Beijing may not need to produce the most advanced AI systems — only those that are affordable and widely deployable. In doing so, it could consolidate global influence by supplying functional, low-cost AI at scale.

Beijing seems to be pursuing exactly that path, developing an AI “open-source” strategy that offers affordable, widely available AI models for companies and individuals to use and modify as they wish. The production of the DeepSeek AI model, which matched the performance of Silicon Valley tools such as ChatGPT at a fraction of the cost for users, created goodwill among Chinese models with developers.

The four most popular models on OpenRouter, an AI hardware platform for developers, are now all Chinese. The goal for China is not only to win the frontier-model race, but to make its systems the default layer of AI adoption across industries and global markets. For most economies, the choice is increasingly between an affordable tool they can deploy now and a more robust one that may be out of reach.

And while the countries adopting Chinese models may be exposed to political pressure and cyber threats from Beijing, safer and more capable alternatives matter little if they are unaffordable. American AI companies are already under pressure to monetize products whose operating costs are rising. If Chinese open-source models become the cheap default for startups, universities, governments and businesses across the developing world, then America’s AI lead will be eroded from below.

Perhaps more concerning for America in the long run is how AI can give Chinese manufacturing even more strength, through the ongoing integration of AI as a general-purpose technology. China’s new Five-Year Plan mentioned AI more than 50 times and includes an “AI+” action plan aimed at spreading AI across the economy.

Beijing has been pioneering automation of its critical infrastructure for years, with promising recent results in increasing warplane production capacity. In that regard, China’s open-model strategy and manufacturing dominance will reinforce each other. Cheap, adaptable models accelerate deployment across the real economy while those deployments generate real-world data and use cases that can feed back into further model improvement.

The United States should not dismiss the importance of its lead in the AI race. That lead worries Beijing, not least because a more automated Chinese economy would also become more vulnerable to AI-generated cyber threats. But nor should Washington assume that China cannot catch up with American capabilities over time.

This AI competition represents part of a broader struggle over tech supply chains and geopolitical influence. Decisions over whether to adopt US or Chinese models could produce a more fragmented global reality, with different regions relying on different cloud providers, chips and security structures. The result will likely be a global economy which is divided into competing spheres, rather than one which produces a single winner.


Miquel Vila is a political and geopolitical risk consultant focusing on industrial strategy, critical infrastructure and global supply chains.

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