November 18, 2025 - 7:00am

Labour’s reworking of the migration system has taken another step, with Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood unveiling a package of reforms aimed at toughening Britain’s stance on illegal migration.

This includes imposing stricter conditions on asylum seekers, the withdrawal of accommodation or financial support from those who break the law, and ending multiple appeals against removal. Perhaps most notably, potential visa bans have been floated for nations which refuse to accept the deportations of migrants and criminals from the UK.

The first three nations to be targeted are Angola, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which have collectively refused to take back more than 4,000 illegal immigrants and criminals. The Home Office has written to their embassies, warning that they have a month to improve cooperation before a sliding scale of sanctions is imposed, which may end in a complete ban on visa grants.

According to the Home Office, these three countries were selected because they are the most “obstructive” in taking back their own nationals. Instances of such non-cooperation include embassies delaying or failing to process the necessary paperwork and insisting that returnees consent to their removal, which effectively gives deportees the ability to block their own deportation.

However, they have also been selected to serve as a dry run before the process is applied to countries that pose bigger challenges. While 4,000 is a large number of refusals, in the context of Britain’s systemic immigration failures it is like trying to stop a flood with a mop. The number of refusals from India, Pakistan and Nigeria, which are also resistant to returnees, is much higher.

Shutting down visas for applicants from Angola, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of Congo would cause minimal economic, political or diplomatic disruption, but taking the same approach with those larger partners would carry significant consequences. The sheer scale of British-Indian trade, and the fact India has made migration a key part of almost all its trade deals, means diplomatic sanctions are economically risky. Meanwhile, the political ramifications of imposing sanctions on Pakistan may be the loss of the numerous Labour seats — including Mahmood’s — currently under threat from independent candidates from British Pakistani backgrounds. Finally, many public services — not least the Prison Service — are increasingly reliant on Nigerian labour, and so cutting visas could mean an end to the supply of low-wage imported labour propping up our crumbling public services.

Luckily, there is evidence that the bans work. Donald Trump’s first administration imposed similar sanctions, which had a broadly positive effect — notably in the African nations of The Gambia and Sierra Leone, which subsequently improved their cooperation on returns.

The UK’s approach will open with softer measures targeting diplomats and VIPs by removing their fast-track privileges for visas, even for holiday travel. This will ultimately culminate in outright visa bans. But there is no reason the process must stop there. Despite the warnings over consequences to Britain’s “soft power” should it be used as a lever, the reality is that millions of pounds flow from Britain to those nations which refuse deportations, and not just in trade or foreign aid. The top recipients of remittances from Britain are — conveniently — India, Pakistan and Nigeria. Threatening visa restrictions alongside damning financial flows could break the deadlock that has long hampered effective deportations. It’s a powerful lever, if only we would grasp it.