How will the war in Ukraine end? In an election overshadowed by a grim climate of international instability, it is remarkable that the only candidate to seriously address this question so far has been Nigel Farage. Laying out Reform’s foreign policy stance, in a discussion the Mirror tells us has sparked “fury” (though from whom is not explained), Farage declared that his party would, in power, “go on sending money to [Ukraine] but I think both sides need to be told that at some point wars either end in negotiation or catastrophe, and this one looks like going on for many, many, many years – and at an horrendous cost of life.” There will, he says, have to be face-to-face talks.
Farage’s intervention is striking not only in how it diverges from the stated Ukraine policy of the two main parties, which is to support Ukraine until “victory” — an end state Kyiv has redefined, over the course of the war, from a return to its pre-invasion 2022 borders to a vastly more daunting return to its 1991 borders — but in how it reflects serious foreign policy debate over the war, and not the dubious platitudes of British party politics. Such absence of strategic thinking, as the respected Russia analyst Mark Galeotti observes, serves neither Ukraine nor the West. As Galeotti notes, “the gap between rhetoric and reality in the West is dangerous because it risks establishing unrealistic expectations.” Closer to Farage’s analysis than mainstream British political discourse, Galeotti cautions that “the likelihood is that some kind of deal will end up being struck which will trade some Ukrainian territory, and maybe guarantees of neutrality, for Moscow’s no doubt grudging acceptance of Kyiv’s sovereignty and independence.” Though Western officials privately brief that this is the likely outcome, publicly this result “runs counter not only to Kyiv’s own position, but also official rhetoric in the West.”
Logically, there are three possible endpoints for the Ukraine War: a complete Ukrainian victory, and total Russian defeat, which even senior Ukrainian officials admit now looks unlikely; its inversion, a total Russian victory, predicated on a Ukrainian collapse, which despite the war slowly shifting in Russia’s favour, does not look imminent; and a freezing of hostilities, perhaps on the current lines. This last outcome reflects the view of America’s then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, back in the winter of 2022, when Ukraine’s successful autumn offensive had forced Russia onto the back foot, and Kyiv had won a negotiating position that, from today’s vantagepoint, looks like a missed opportunity. Yet the Biden administration at the time quashed Milley’s talk of a diplomatic push, with the President declaring: “That’s up to the Ukrainians. Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.”
But Kyiv’s decision to spurn talks and continue the war was predicated on hopes of a successful 2023 offensive dramatically weakening Russia’s battlefield position and the belief that American military support could be maintained until the final victory: yet the offensive was a costly failure and America’s support is increasingly contested in Washington. But while the result has been a deterioration in Ukraine’s battlefield position, Washington’s publicly stated goals have not altered: the facts on the ground may have changed for the worse, but the rhetoric in Washington, and far less Westminster, has not adapted to the new reality.
Yet what would a realistic Ukraine policy look like? The irony is that even if the West’s desired endstate shifts towards a negotiated settlement rather than outright military victory, nothing would actually change that much, for now, at least. When Ukraine appeared to gain the upper hand back in 2022, Kyiv, scenting victory, had no desire to pursue meaningful negotiations. Now that Russia has the upper hand, Moscow, equally, has no desire to make the concessions necessary towards constructive peace talks. Putin’s purported “ceasefire offer”, proposed at the beginning of last week’s Ukrainian-led “peace summit” (taking place without Russia’s inclusion, and which Biden chose not to attend), if anything represents a hardening of Moscow’s position: as recently as last month, the mood music from the Kremlin centred on freezing hostilities on the current frontlines.
As a precondition for talks, Putin insisted that Ukraine withdraw its remaining troops from the four Ukrainian provinces — Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson — that Russia formally annexed in autumn 2022, even as the Ukrainian offensive forced it to abandon huge swathes of the latter two. While Russia’s insistence that Ukraine does not join Nato is not, within the context of negotiations, unreasonable — Western rhetoric notwithstanding, there is little realistic prospect of this happening — it is unrealistic to demand Ukraine cede control of large areas of its own territory that it still controls. Russian troops are advancing, slowly, all across the front but have as yet made no great breakthrough. Putin may be counting on a new summer offensive before the onset of winter snows, or be satisfied that a war of attrition will eventually break the Ukrainian army beyond repair, but for now Ukraine’s position is, if difficult, not disastrous, and it is entirely rational at this stage for Kyiv to reject the Russian proposal. Russia’s offer of talks was, paradoxically, Moscow’s statement that it is not yet ready to negotiate.
Join the discussion
Join like minded readers that support our journalism by becoming a paid subscriber
To join the discussion in the comments, become a paid subscriber.
Join like minded readers that support our journalism, read unlimited articles and enjoy other subscriber-only benefits.
Subscribe