If Putin will not put economic costs ahead of his security goals, how else might sanctions work? Classically, comprehensive embargoes seemed to be guided by a ānaĆÆve theoryā of sanctions, whereby economic suffering is expected to compel the population to rise up against their wicked leaders. But this rarely, if ever, happens. If anything, economic immiseration tends to fragment and weaken the population, who become absorbed by the struggle to subsist and more reliant on government help ā as seen in Iraq.
Targeted sanctions work on an equally naĆÆve basis, assuming that political leaders and their business cronies are completely autonomous from the people, such that manipulating their personal wealth will convince them to change course. In truth, political leaders always represent some broader set of forces in their regime and wider society. Their policies reflect that underlying coalition. If they change course, they will have to answer to their supporters.
Vladimir Putin is a powerful and quasi-authoritarian leader, but he is not autonomous from Russian society. His rise reflects a broadly-based nationalist backlash against the consequences of neoliberal āshock therapyā practised on Russia by the International Monetary Fund after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Under the pro-Western President Yeltsin, the public wealth built up under communism was pillaged by oligarchs, while the Russian people suffered astonishing levels of deprivation. In theĀ decade to 1998, GDP fell by 45%, mortality increased by 50%, government revenues had nearly halved, and crime had doubled.
Putin rose to power by promising to halt and reverse Russiaās national decline. In his first seven years in office, real wagesĀ doubled (albeit from a low base). Using soaring oil revenues, Putin stabilised the economy and paid off foreign debt, reasserting Russiaās sovereignty. He brought the oligarchs to heel, jailing or exiling anyone who would not recognise the stateās supremacy. And he restored stability and a measure of national pride to an exhausted and demoralised people. His regime, centred on a network of silovikiĀ (security and military officials) and managers of state-owned enterprises, has proven politically robust and durable ā a state within the state.
This is important not to praise or exonerate Putin, but to understand why his popularity has remained high, even under sanctions.Ā Experimental researchĀ suggests that Russiaās economic decline since 2014 ā mostly caused by declining oil prices, though compounded by sanctions ā has cost Putin some support. But it has been more than compensated for by an upsurge in nationalist backing. PutināsĀ approval ratingĀ increased from 65% in January 2014 to 86% in April 2014, following the annexation of Crimea. It remained above 80% for the next two years before returning to the high 60s.
Today, aĀ large majorityĀ of Russians blame the West for the crisis in Ukraine, whileĀ two-thirdsĀ have little or no concern about sanctions. Putinās regime may have persecuted opposition figures, curbed dissent, and restricted electoral competition ā but, despite such authoritarian measures, he retains widespread support. Western leaders could only dream of his approval ratings: support for Biden stands atĀ 42%, for Macron, 40%, and, for Boris Johnson, justĀ 25%.
Nor is there much sign of political fracture within the regime that sanctions could exploit. Putinās ability toĀ publicly humiliateĀ his spy chief, who bodged his lines at the televised, stage-managed security council meeting prior to Russiaās invasion of Ukraine, suggests he feels secure and confident. The overwhelming vote in the Duma ofĀ 400 to zeroĀ in favour of recognising the breakaway ārepublicsā of Donetsk and Luhansk suggests either broad elite consensus or an unwillingness to openly defy the Kremlin. Exactly how the (modest) economic pain caused by sanctions is meant to generate political gain is therefore hard to discern.
All too often, sanctions are a comforting but dangerous illusion: they are alluring because they seem to provide an effective option between war and words. When diplomacy seems to fail, and states are unwilling to risk war, something else is needed ā and that something is sanctions. But just because something must be done does not mean that this āsomethingā is going to work. Moreover, it is all too easy to forget that embargoes are a weapon of war, often devastating target populations and escalating conflicts, rather than peacefully resolving them. In response to the latest sanctions, Putin has put Russiaās nuclear forces on high alert. It seems unlikely that he would deploy them in response to banking sanctions. But this is a reminder of that the stakes are incredibly high.
Ultimately, even if sanctions do bite, we need to ask: what is the endgame? Sanctions are at best a means to an end, and surely the desired end is lasting peace in Eastern Europe. And one does not need to have any sympathy whatsoever with the Putin regime to believe that this can only be achieved by reckoning with core Russian interests.
Like it or not, powerful states have the capacity to inflict serious harm on weaker ones ā just ask the Serbs, Libyans, Afghans, Iraqis and Syrians on the receiving end of the Nato powersā tender mercies. If Russia is dissatisfied, it clearly has the power to upset the existing order by force. The only way to prevent this is to compromise with Russiaās concerns, or deploy overwhelming force to deter it from using its military power. The West has done neither, dismissing Putinās demands to establish a neutral buffer zone between Russia and Nato, while failing to deter him from using force to achieve his objectives.
The only way out of this disaster is a negotiated settlement, which will require Nato to reckon with Russian interests, and preserve Ukrainian democracy and sovereignty within a framework of international neutrality. For the brutal reality is this: sanctions are unlikely to force Russia out of Ukraine, and the West is unwilling to be drawn directly into battle with a nuclear-armed state. Unless a diplomatic solution can be found, sanctions are likely to be merely part of a grinding proxy war along the lines of the brutal and horrific conflict in Syria.
The people of Ukraine have already suffered too much. Sanctions wonāt save them ā they may only make their misery worse.
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