Granted, I donāt think an opposition between style and substance is a recipe for ambiguity. Certain content speaks for itself: readers’ capacity for discernment is not as fragile as some assume. Nevertheless, the thick editorialising endemic to commentary on political extremism makes for boring writing, belittles readersā intelligence and seldom persuades anyone to think in new ways.
But the approach is risky at a time when accusations of ambiguity can stand alone as slurs. American writer Thomas Chatterton Williams experienced this during the reception of his recent memoirĀ Unlearning Race,Ā in which the Left-leaning, mixed-raced author criticises race-based political and social mobilisation. The spear-tip of a scorchingĀ BookforumĀ review was the allegation that Williamsā was āpolitically incoherent.ā Dig a bit and youād see that the reviewer wasnāt actually confounded by Williamās arguments; he thought that author was simply (and quite coherently) wrong. But āincoherentā and āwrongā will appear synonymous to those certain of their own virtue and insight.
Still, even insincere branding as āpolitically incoherentā seems a kind of luxury. More often, cultural authorities respond to ambiguities with frantic attempts to classify in familiar terms. J.D. Vanceās memoir and its Golden-Globe nominated Netflix adaptation provide a recent example.
Hillbilly ElegyĀ chronicles the economic and social traumas of Vanceās childhood in post-industrial Ohio, and the book and its author became oracles for the American centre-Left following the 2016 elections, when understanding the white working-class was in vogue. It didnāt take long, however, for critics to identify the bookās less savoury features: its inattention to racial dynamics in greater Appalachia and its alleged moral of individualistic self-improvement. For these critics, the bookās deficiencies didnāt temper its virtues ā they erased them. By the time of the filmās release in late 2020, Hillbilly ElegyĀ had been decried as a Right-wing imposter that exposed poverty in the wrong ways and for the wrong reasons. It was a small step thereafter for critics to dismiss the film, as the New Yorker did, as little more than āa libertarianās dreamā.
LikeĀ Hillbilly Elegy, my book hasnāt had a straight-forward reception. In the UK and the US, it was generally welcomed by the anti-establishment Left and Right, but the political centre judged it more harshly. Centrists complained that I was too chummy with the subjects I was supposed to be taking down ā I called Steve Bannon āSteveā ā and that analysis of my subjectsā ideas was itself a form of adoration. Few mentioned an opposition between my language and the content of the book, though this was sometimes amusingly implied. GuardianĀ journalist Luke Harding wrote that the book āinfuriatedā him because its presentation allegedly obscured the consequences of the ideas I profiled, consequences he came to understand ā as best I can tell ā by reading the book.
Because for much of the Anglo-American cultural establishment, form isĀ content. Symbolic politics reigns as language and rhetoric become the key indicators of ideological virtue and political identity. Things must be called out, fascism described as fascism ā so that gullible readers are never duped, and so that nobody will wonder whose side the author is on. And a book that doesnāt proclaim its opposition to Steve Bannon cannot in any meaningful way be critical of him.
Itās striking, then, that the same book was received so differently by the Left and Centre Left in another context. It may have begun with a gift from Olavo de Carvalho ā Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaroās guru and the third main subject of my book. Whereas Bannon was ambivalent in private and mum in public about my book, and Russian Aleksandr Dugin messaged me calling it āmuch better than anything elseā and publicised positive reviews, Carvalho went berserk. From the time of its release and until the present ā across BBC interviews, Twitter threads and hour-long YouTube rants spread to his nearly one million social media devotees ā he described the book as pure lies. He called me a fake scholar, out to harm him and Bannon, and christened me with a baffling, Trump-style nickname: āTiger balm.ā
What followed? Universal praise in Brazilās mainstream media and features in all its major papers. The book was quickly translated to Portuguese and is already selling into its second printing.Ā Olavo vaporised whatever potential the book had to appear politically ambiguous. In Brazil, it was an anti-Olavo book, and his and President Bolsonaroās many opponents jumped to my side.
It was personal for many of those opponents. Olavo, though he turned down offers for a ministerial post in Bolsonaroās Right-wing populist government, uses his social media megaphone to drive popular support for the Brazilian presidentās anti-establishment agenda, skewering bureaucrats, scientists, academics and the media with the filthiest prose you can imagine.
Those targeted surely feel solidarity with each other, and with me, but there may be other reasons why I got a different read in Brazil. The countryās Left is fundamentally unlike that of the UK and US. While the latter is increasingly defined by social capital,Ā prominent Brazilian leftists are murdered in the streets and coerced, sued or otherwise threatened in their positions as government representatives or journalists. Fighting for survival leaves less space for games of posturing. Content matters more than style if you are in an actual, rather than a symbolic, struggle. And in Brazil, Iām yet to hear a reviewer complain about the names or labels I use.
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